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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzed four significant rulings by the Federal Courts, Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office with respect to 
disputes regarding the best value selections in Government procurement and 
recommended ways to integrate these lessons into procurement organizations. 
Best value entails the use of weighted factors that reflect the relative importance 
of each factor to the user. This allows the introduction of past performance, experience, 
technical approach, and other factors to be considered in addition to price. 
The thesis analyzed the issues of four specific cases to determine if there is a 
pattern of weakness in a specific area of best value implementation. The aim is to bring 
any weaknesses to the attention of the acquisition professional in order to promote better 
application of best value and avoid future disputes, or at a minimum eliminate sustained 
disputes against the Government. 
This thesis also looked at the commercial sector use of best value selections to 
view the similarities and differences that can be used to compare strengths and 
weaknesses of the Government's approach. 
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I.       INTRODUCTION 
A.       PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze significant rulings by the Federal Courts, 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office with respect 
to disputes regarding the best value selections in Government procurement. These 
decisions may contain lessons learned that will eliminate future disputes or point to an 
area that requires a regulatory solution. The thesis is also designed to recommend ways 
to integrate these lessons into procurement organizations. 
The researcher is particularly interested in the disputes that have arisen from the 
introduction of best value and how they have been resolved. This thesis will review and 
analyze the issues of specific cases from the Federal Courts, Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office to determine if there is a pattern of 
weakness in a specific area of best value implementation. The aim is to bring any 
weaknesses to the attention of the acquisition professional in order to promote better 
application of best value and avoid future disputes or at a minimum eliminate sustained 
disputes against the Government. 
This thesis will look at the commercial sector use of best value selections to view 
the similarities as well as any differences that can be used to compare strengths and 
weaknesses of the Government's approach. 
This thesis will also look to determine if regulatory changes would improve the 
acquisition process, or more specifically, those areas of the contract process that generate 
most of the disputes and protests. A review of the cases will be used to identify potential 
problem areas, and then a review of the regulations will identify the current requirements. 
This comparison between the usage and regulations may illuminate the need for a 
regulatory change or conclude that no change is necessary. 
Finally, this research effort will offer recommendations to improve the process 
and provide for the use of best value in a more effective and efficient manner. 
B.   BACKGROUND 
The Department of Defense (DoD) possesses the largest and one of the most 
complex acquisition processes in the United States Government. Because DoD is the 
single largest purchasing activity in the world, there are numerous claims that arise on the 
part of the Government and commercial entities. The Government's use of best value in 
source selection by its very nature involves judgment on the part of the Government as to 
what is value and in some instances these judgments have led to disputes with 
contractors. 
The use of best value entails the use of factors in a weighted scheme that reflects 
the relative importance of each factor to the Government. This allows the introduction of 
past performance, experience, technical approach, and other factors to be considered in 
addition to price instead of relying on the lowest price technically acceptable approach 
that awards contracts to the lowest bidder without considering other factors. 
It is the duty of each party to attempt to reach agreement on these disputes at the 
lowest possible level in an expeditious manner in order to minimize any cost or schedule 
impact, however, this is not always possible and so a formal mechanism has been created 
to systematically evaluate the claims.   Some protests can be handled by the General 
Accounting Office, where disputes must be dealt with by the Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals or Federal Court. These decisions not only decide the specific case but 
also set a precedent for future cases in our common law system. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what extent have recent rulings and decisions by the Federal Courts, Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office highlighted 
recurring problems with best value selections and is there a means to eliminate the 
problems? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
There are five secondary research questions: 
a. What is the background and history of best value in Government 
Procurement? 
b. What will analysis of Federal Court, Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals, and General Accounting Office decisions reveal about the Government's 
implementation of best value? 
c. How does the commercial sector utilize best value in conducting business? 
d. What are the lessons learned regarding best value? 
e. What mechanism can be put in place for the promulgation, dissemination, 
and incorporation of the lessons into the conduct of the Government's procurement 
professionals? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this thesis will involve a brief review of the history of the Federal 
Court, Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office 
involvement in Federal procurement, as well as a review of existing regulations and acts 
defining the use of best value. 
The primary thrust of this thesis will involve an analysis of four selected cases 
from the U.S. Claims Court rulings involving best value, Armed Services Board of 
Contract Appeals decisions revolving around the use of best value, or General 
Accounting Office recommendations concerning best value selections. 
The thesis will also review the commercial sector implementation of best value by 
certain companies as a comparison. 
The thesis will close with recommendations to integrate any lessons learned into 
local procurement organizations. 
E.        ORGANIZATION 
Chapter I of this thesis presents the purpose of the thesis and the research 
questions that guide the research and analysis effort. Additionally, this chapter discusses 
the background, scope, and methodology of this study. 
Chapter II defines best value and its use in the Government procurements 
selection process. This chapter also describes the claims process and how it relates to the 
General Accounting Office, Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals, and Federal 
Courts. 
Chapter III provides a brief description of the population of cases from which the 
selected cases were drawn and the method for gathering information from the commercial 
sector. 
Chapter IV details the facts of the selected cases and the analysis of each case 
with respect to the points of contract law involved. In addition, the researcher will 
highlight weaknesses in the Government and contractor positions relative to contracting 
practices. 
Chapter V will detail the implementation of best value in the commercial sector, 
as well as, some of the problems the commercial sector has had in the use of best value. 
Chapter VI presents the conclusions and recommendations generated through this 
study, along with areas for future research on the subject of best value. 
F.   METHODOLOGY 
The study and analysis were conducted using the following methods: 
1. Review of the books, magazine articles, CD-ROM systems, Government 
reports, Internet based materials defining the use of best value in Government 
procurement. 
2. Review and analysis of recent key Federal Court, Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office decisions where best value was an 
issue. 
3. Review how these decisions are currently disseminated to procurement 
professionals. 
4. Review commercial sector best value implementation from National 
Contract Management Association contacts (2) through interviews. 
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II.      FRAMEWORK 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides the background and definition of best value and its place in 
the Government's procurement system. The acquisition and contract processes will also 
be detailed in order to set a framework for the areas that may be eligible for protest or 
dispute, and to demonstrate how best value trade-offs impact the system that is finally 
fielded. This chapter will also provide the reader with an overview of the organizations 
involved in the protest and claims arenas, and the current procedures for a GAO protest 
or a dispute involving the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals or the Federal 
Court system. 
B. BEST VALUE DEFINITION 
Best Value is the subjective term used to describe the Government's preferred 
source selection outcome in contractual arrangements—the implication being the lowest 
bidder does not always provide the item that best fits the Government's requirement in 
terms of total ownership costs and performance. 
Best value is a critical element to the Government's acquisition reform movement 
to reduce costs and promote efficient purchasing while maintaining a robust war fighting 
capability and a responsive industrial base. Best value has no explicit statutory or 
regulatory meaning, however, it represents the trade-offs in requirements that are the 
primary goals of Government acquisition. This goal has no absolute definition in terms 
of source selection objectives but changes due to the unique nature of each procurement 
action.   Best value encompasses the ideas and methods espoused by life-cycle costing, 
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cost as an independent variable, cost-benefit analysis, performance vs. design 
specifications, evolutionary purchasing, commercial best practices, performance 
incentive contracting, price based acquisition, and past performance as an evaluation 
factor. 
Executive Order 12931 directed executive agencies to "...place more emphasis on 
past performance and promote best value rather than simply low cost in selecting sources 
for supplies and services"[Ref. ]]. In light of this, the Government has sought to define 
exactly what best value means and how to obtain it in source selection. 
• Federal Acquisition and Contract Management provides the definition in terms of 
the Government's purchasing expectations, "...the expected outcome on an acquisition 
that in the government's estimation, provides the greatest overall benefit in response to 
the requirement"[Ref. 2]. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) does not define best value, but rather 
discusses the best value continuum in light of the source selection process in negotiated 
contracting. The Government can obtain best value in a negotiated acquisition by using 
one or a combination of several source selection approaches from the use of a "trade-off 
process" to the "lowest price technically acceptable"[Ref 3]. The FAR defines the 
source selection objective, "...to select the proposal that represents the best value"[Ref. 
3]. 
The Department of Navy, Acquisition Reform Office web-site provides the best 
definition, describing best value as a process used in competitive, negotiated contracting 
to select"...the most advantageous offer by evaluating and comparing factors in addition 
to cost or price..."[Ref. 4] by allowing tradeoffs between cost and non-cost evaluation 
8 
factors to give the contracting officer flexibility resulting in a contract award that 
provides the Government "...the greatest or best value for its money...the preferred 
source selection methodology"[Ref. 4]. 
The Army's guide to best value source selection defines best value in terms of the 
ultimate customer, 
...the outcome of any acquisition that ensures we meet the customers 
needs in the most effective, economical, and timely manner...the goal of 
sealed bidding, simplified acquisition, commercial item acquisition, 
negotiated acquisition, and any other specialized acquisition methods or 
combination of methods you choose to use.[Ref.5] 
There is not a singular definition of best value, rather it is a concept that is defined 
in terms of objectives, factors, methodologies, and processes used to obtain a goal of best 
value for Government contracting. 
For the purposes of this thesis effort, best value is defined as the formal process 
by which the Government develops a requirement that involves a trade-off between two 
or more evaluation factors, solicits bids, and makes the judgment as to which effort most 
closely fulfills the Government's needs. 
C.       THE ACQUISITION AND CONTRACT PROCESSES 
The selection of a bid or offer based on best value is a key component of the 
contract process, which itself is an integral part of the Government's acquisition process. 
The contract process is the formal portion of acquisition process that defines the 
Government-contractor relationship, creating the actual documentation and applying the 
laws that can become the basis of a protest or claim. The acquisition and contract 
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Figure 2.1       The Acquisition and Contract Processes [Ref. 6] 
The first step in the acquisition process is for the organization to review its 
mission in the context of its role in the Government. In the case of the Department of 
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Defense, the mission is to defend the United States and her allies. This is a very nebulous 
mission and would be difficult to translate into an effective process so the mission must 
be somewhat more specific. The second step is to define the needs of the organization in 
carrying out it mission, this is followed by determining the requirement. The fourth step 
is where some of the ambiguousness of the earlier steps starts to take on form. The 
requirements identification phase results in a statement or work, statement of objective, 
or design specification and results in a procurement request. 
The next six steps are a subgroup of the acquisition process referred to as the 
contract process and includes: the acquisition planning phase; the solicitation phase; 
source evaluation and possible selection; negotiation phase; contract award phase; and 
contract administration phase. The contract process is where the protests and disputes 
arise because this is the arena where the Government interacts with the industrial base 
using laws that attempt to ensure the Government gets best value while simultaneously 
achieving certain socio-economic goals and adhering to a rigid legal and regulatory 
framework. The contract process also defines the relationship and results in the 
documentation that is needed to prove the intent of the parties. 
The first step of the contract process, fifth step of the acquisition process, is the 
acquisition planning phase. During this phase, the Government conducts market research 
to determine what is available in industry as far as products that may meet the 
requirement or the industrial capability to develop a system that meets the requirement. 
This phase also involves determining the level of competition in the market, as well as 
potentially conducting a pre-solicitation conference to inform industry of the broad 
parameters of the acquisition if the program deems it beneficial to the Government or 
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industry. Another method used to develop industry input during this phase is the posting 
of a program synopsis in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD).  The Government must 
also develop the acquisition plan deliverables, such as: determining the contract method 
(sealed bid or competitive proposal); determine the contract type that best fits this 
acquisition; develop a Statement of Work or Statement of Objective; cost goals; 
technical, cost and schedule risks; develop a Source Selection Plan to maximize 
competition,  minimize the  complexity of the  solicitation  and evaluation/selection 
decision, ensure impartiality, and ensure the selection of the source whose proposal has 
the highest degree of realism and will provide the Government with best value; develop 
the evaluation criteria for the best value factors of performance, technical approach, past 
performance, quality, and cost/price; and draft the Request for Proposal (RFP). 
The solicitation phase is the second phase of the contract process and involves the 
solicitation documents and the posting of the RFP or an Invitation for Bid (IFB). The 
IFB is used if the acquisition is be evaluated as Lowest Price Technically Acceptable 
(LPTA). An LPTA is still considered to be along the best value continuum, it just 
indicates that as long as the product or service meets certain minimum standards price 
will be the only factor used to determine the awardee. This phase can also involve 
holding a bidders conference if desired and modifying or amending the solicitation if 
necessary. 
The source evaluation phase is the third step of the contract process, seventh step 
of the acquisition process. The formal source selection process outlined here may be 
abbreviated depending on the complexity of the product or service involved in the 
acquisition, however, each of the elements of this process needs to be considered in every 
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acquisition. A general source selection team is hierarchical in nature, with the Source 
Selection Authority (SSA) at the top, supported by a Source Selection Advisory Council 
(SSAC) and a Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) as portrayed in Figure 2.2. 
The evaluation process starts with the receipt of the proposal by the SSEB. The 
SSEB "is a group of military and/or civilian personnel, representing the various 
functional and technical areas involved in the acquisition"[Ref. 2]. The SSEB, which is 
appointed by the SSAC, evaluates the proposals against the RFP to determine those that 
meet the requirement. The SSEB will evaluate and score each of the proposal the against 
the requirements spelled out in the source selection plan, the goal is to ensure only 
proposals that meet the criteria standard are forwarded to the SSAC. 
The SSAC "...is a group of senior Government personnel appointed to serve as 
the staff and advisors to the SSA during the source selection pro cess" [Ref. 2]. The SSAC 
analyzes the results of the SSEB and draw conclusion relative to price/cost, technical 
effectiveness, risk, the offeror's past performance and current capabilities, results of the 
negotiations, and other factors requested by the SSA or that the may have an impact on 
the selection. The SSAC also evaluates the proposals against each other to establish the 
competitive range, which includes those contractors that have the best chance of being 
awarded the contract based on the evaluation factors spelled out in the Source Selection 
Plan. 
The SSA "...is the official appointed to direct the source selection process"[Ref. 
2]. The SSA approves the Source Selection Plan, appoints the chairman and members to 
the SSAC, and most importantly, selects the contract awardee. 
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Figure 2.2       Source Selection Process [Ref. 6] 
The fourth step of the contract process, eighth step of the acquisition process is 
the negotiation phase. The Government negotiates with those offerors in the competitive 
range in order to move the contractor(s) closer to the Government's best value objective. 
The agreement is approved and the unsuccessful offerors are debriefed in order to 
provide them feedback on ways that they may improve their proposals and position for 
future acquisitions. 
14 
The next step is the contract award phase, where the contract is actually signed 
and the award is announced in the CBD. Congress is also notified of large buys because 
of the fiscal impact and the potential for interest from their constituents. 
The final step in the contract process is the contract administration phase. This 
phase involves the monitoring and surveillance of the contractor performance as well as 
reviewing the cost allowability for a cost reimbursement type contract. 
The eleventh phase of the acquisition process is the ownership phase. The 
ownership phase is the phase that all prior steps are designed to achieve. This is where 
the system is fielded and the end user operates the equipment. Good best value trade-off 
decisions show during this phase through increased performance, lower cost, or the 
delivery schedule being met by the contractor. The ownership phase typically accounts 
for 60 to 80 percent of the Total Ownership Costs (TOC) of a major system, so any 
decision in the earlier steps that requires or saves the expenditure of resources is 
magnified in this phase.[Ref. 7] 
The final step in the acquisition process is the disposal of the system at the end of 
its useful life. This may involve reuse, demilitarization considerations, hazardous 
materials, or the transfer of an asset to an allied Government. 
D.        THE PROTEST PROCESS 
A protest is a complaint by a party that the agency involved in a specific 
solicitation has failed to carry out statutory or regulatory requirements properly. 
Historically, protests were filed with the Contracting Officer or the General Accounting 
Office (GAO).   The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 gave GAO oversight of 
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protests a statutory foundation but left dissatisfied contractors with the option to submit 
bid protests to the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
Protests have a significant impact on Government procurement. A Contracting 
Officer may need to spend considerable time and effort researching protest decisions to 
ensure that their procurement actions reflect the correct procedures and statutes in order 
to avoid a the likelihood of a protest. They may also be called upon to support their, and 
the agency's, actions when a protest does arise. 
From the perspective of an agency's mission and program progress, 
protests are dramatically important because they may introduce substantial 
delay and when an agency is found to have faulty procurement processes, 
embarrassment. Budgetary and legislative consequences could be 
generated if significant errors or deficiencies are disclosed as a result of 
the protest procedures. [Ref. 8] 
The protest process allows contractors to have an independent party review 
certain Government actions that the contractor feels unfairly affected his ability to 
compete. The protest must be in writing and are heard by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO), who reviews the facts of the protest and make a recommendation to the Agency 
or Department. 
Protests may be filed to take exception to Governmental action relative to the 
release of a solicitation by an agency or department for bids or offers, the proposed award 
of a contract, or the actual award of contract. The protest is valid only if GAO 
determines that the originating contractor has "standing". Factors for determining if a 
protestor has "standing" are: 
An offeror who submits a late is not an interested party for protest 
purposes. Generally, to be an interested party, a protestor must be in line 
for award if the protest is sustained. However, even a protester not in line 
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may be an interested party if he seeks cancellation of the solicitation and 
resolicitation of the requirement. In that case, if successful, the protestor 
would be able to compete again. A party who submits a late proposal does 
not have standing to protest the evaluation of proposals or any changes in 
terms of the solicitation that result from proposal evaluation. Such issues 
affect only the parties that remain in the competition. [Ref. 2] 
A bidder/offeror who is non-responsive for other than non-correctable 
technical deficiencies, may be considered an interested party. If the 
protest were sustained, the protestor would likely be eligible to participate 
in reopened negotiations or the resolicitation of the requirement. This is a 
different situation than the protestor who submits a late bid or 
proposal.[Ref. 2] 
One exception does exist from the "interested party" rule. When a bidder 
or offeror wants to protest the terms of a solicitation before the bids or 
proposals are due, a protest cannot be filed without affecting its right to 
remain in the competition. The protest is considered to be valid. [Ref. 2] 
To be valid, the protest must be filed directly with the GAO within 10 days of the 
event that is the contractor's basis for the protest and the protester has one day to furnish 
a copy of the protest to the Contracting Officer. The Contracting Officer must suspend 
performance or tenninate the awarded contract if he receives notice of a protest filed with 
the GAO within 10 days after award of the contract. 
GAO will review the protest based on the facts of the case and can make 
recommendations to the Contracting Officer regarding issues involving the solicitation, 
evaluation, competitive range determination, discussions, negotiations, or award. GAO is 
not a true court, so if the Government disagrees with GAO's recommendations, it can 
choose to ignore the recommendation. However, GAO is an independent review of the 
Government's actions so Contracting Officers are required to consider all protests, filed 
before or after the award and should involve the command's legal team prior to making 
any decision on the handling of a protest. 
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If a contractor is not satisfied with the GAO recommendation or the Contracting 
Officer's handling of it, the protestor may file a suit in the U.S. Federal Court of Claims. 
When bringing suit, the protestor must also seek an injunction to enjoin the Government 
from awarding the contract or, if the contract is already awarded, permitting further 
performance until the matter is resolved. 
The GAO serves as an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for Congress 
and investigates how the Government spends funds in order to determine how well the 
executive branch is meeting the intent and objective of the funds appropriated by 
Congress and signed into law by the President. 
GAO was created by the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 by transferring 
auditing, accounting, and claims functions from the Treasury Department to the newly 
created agency, moving these functions from the executive to legislative branch. 
GAO provides numerous services to Congress, including: 1) evaluating how well 
Government policies and programs are working; 2) auditing agency operations to 
determine whether federal funds are being spent efficiently, effectively, and 
appropriately; 3) investigating allegations of illegal and improper activities, and; 4) 
issuing legal decision and opinions. 
It is this fourth area of GAO activities, issuing legal decisions and opinions that 
brings GAO squarely into the realm of the Government's procurement system. GAO has 
the responsibility of hearing protests and then making recommendations based on the law 
and facts of the case. 
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E.        THE DISPUTES PROCESS 
A contract dispute differs from a protest due to the fact that disputes result from 
an existing contract and involve rights and obligations "...are actionable under terms of 
the contract for which legal remedies exist"[Ref. 8]. The Contract Disputes Act of 1978 
(CDA) codified the method by which disputes between a contractor and the Government 
are resolved. The CDA has given the contractor the right to appeal the COFD to a Board 
of Contract Appeals or the Court of Federal Claims. In most cases, mediation and 
negotiation efforts should be exhausted prior to entering into the disputes process. The 
disputes process starts with a Contracting Officer's Final Decision (COFD) and may, in 
certain circumstances, be appealed to the United States Supreme Court. Figure 2.3 
conveys the hierarchical nature of the disputes process. 
1. Claim Assertion 
The dispute process commences with the contractor's written claim against the 
Government. The CDA contains no standardized format for a claim. However, the CDA 
does say that a valid claim must be in writing and submitted to the Contracting Officer, 
certified if over $100,000. The CDA further stipulates that: 
For claims of more than $100,000, the contractor shall certify that the 
claim is made in good faith, that the supporting data are accurate and 
complete to the best of his or her knowledge and belief, that the amount 
requested accurately reflects the contract adjustment for which the 
contractor believes the Government is liable, and that the certifier is duly 
authorized to certify the claim on behalf of the contractor. [Ref. 9] 
Once the Contracting Officer receives the claim, he is required to make a timely 
decision on the claim.  The receipt of the claim also starts the clock for calculating the 
interest due on the claimed amount.   It is in the best interests of both parties to try to 
resolve the dispute at the lowest possible level due to the added costs in terms of time and 
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money that each step in the dispute phase entails. Additionally, a positive relationship 
between the Government and contractor has a better chance of being maintained if the 
parties reach an agreement instead of going through the formal disputes process, which is 
adversarial in nature. 
2. Contracting Officer's Final Decision 
This initial step of the disputes process requires that the Contracting Officer 
render a final decision rejecting the contractor's claim on behalf of the Government. 
The Contracting Officer and contractor first attempt to resolve the claim through 
negotiation acting on behalf of their respective stakeholders. If they are successful, they 
have in essence modified the contract and come to a new bilateral agreement. If the 
Contracting Officer and the contractor cannot successfully negotiate the claim to the 
satisfaction of both parties, the CDA requires that the Contracting Officer render a final 
decision rejecting the claim on behalf of the Government, this decision is called the 
Contracting Officer's Final Decision (COFD). The COFD becomes the first step in the 
disputes process. 
The Contracting Officer's Final Decision includes: 
1. A description of the claim or dispute. 
2. A reference to the pertinent contract provisions. 
3. A statement of the factual areas of agreement or disagreement. 
4. The Contracting Officer's supporting rationale. 
5. A demand for payment when the decision finds that the contractor is indebted 
to the Government. 
When rendering a COFD, the Contracting Officer must analyze the claim based 
on procurement regulations and the objective merits of the claim and not allow any bias 
from his position as the Contracting Officer to influence the decision.   The Contracting 
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Figure 2.3       Disputes Process [Ref. 6] 
Officer is presumed to have acted in good faith and a contractor must present, "well-nigh 
irrefragable proof to overcome the presumption of good faith dealing"[Ref. 10]. Since 
the Contracting Officer renders the COFD and is assumed to be acting in good faith to all 
parties, the contractor is the only party that may challenge the COFD. The Government, 
by issuing the Contracting Officer a warrant to contract on behalf of the Government, 
certifies that the COFD is a valid outcome. 
The COFD must include a paragraph that details the contractor's rights, relative to 
possible appeals. The paragraph spells out the alternatives available, as follows: 
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This is the final decision of the Contracting Officer. You may appeal this 
decision to the agency board of contract appeals. If you decide to appeal, 
you must, within 90 days from the date you receive this decision, mail or 
otherwise furnish written notice to the agency board of contract appeals 
and provide a copy to the Contracting Officer from whose decision the 
appeal is taken. The notice shall indicate that an appeal is taken. The 
notice shall indicate that an appeal is intended, reference this decision, and 
identify the contract by number. With regard to appeals to the agency 
board of contract appeals, you may, solely at your election, proceed under 
the board's small claims procedure for claims of [$50,000] or less or it's 
accelerated procedure for claims of [$100,000] or less. Instead of 
appealing to the agency board of contract appeals, you may bring an 
action directly in the United States Court of Federal Claims within 12 
months of the date you receive this decision. [Ref. 9] 
This paragraph presents the contractor with a choice of where he would like to 
officially challenge the COFD based on Government's position. The CDA details that 
the contractor may present his case to the Agency's Board of Contract Appeals or bring 
suit directly against the Government in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. 
If the Contracting Officer fails to issue a COFD in a timely manner, the courts and 
agency board of contracts appeals have acted as if the COFD had been issued denying the 
contractor's claim. 
3.        United States Court of Federal Claims 
The CDA gives the contractor the option of appealing an adverse COFD directly 
to the United States Court of Federal Claims, formerly the Court of Claims. The original 
Court of Claims was created by Congress to "...safeguard the financial stability of the 
Government by not permitting a multitude of claims to deplete the treasury"[Ref 11]. 
Originally, the Court of Claims could only hear claims and determine if they had 
merit, Congress was still required to review the claims found to have merit and then act 
on them.   It was not until 1861 that President Lincoln recommended, and Congress 
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accepted in 1863, that the judgments of the Court of Claims be considered final, requiring 
no further action by Congress that the courts jurisdiction over claims was created. 
The Court of Federal Claims is the trail court for Federal contract suits and the 
Federal Courts Administration Acts clarified its jurisdiction and procedures in 1982 and 
1992. 
The court hears lawsuits against the United States based on the 
Constitution, federal laws, or contracts, or for damages in actions other 
than torts. It also has jurisdiction to determine cases concerning the 
salaries of public officers or agents, damages for someone who was 
unjustly convicted of a federal crime and imprisoned, and some American 
Indian claims.[Ref. 11] 
4. Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 
The Armed Service Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) is the oldest and largest 
of the Government's 11 Board of Contract Appeals. The mission of the ASBCA is to 
provide fair and relatively fast resolution of contract disputes, thus avoiding the great 
expense and time consumption of the Federal court system. 
The ASBCA was created through the consolidation of the former War 
Department Board of Contract Appeals and the Navy Compensation Board in 1949 and 
was chartered to act as, 
...the authorized representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 
of the Army, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of the Air Force, 
in hearing, considering and determining appeals by contractors from 
decisions of contracting officers or their authorized representatives or 
other authorities on disputed questions.[Ref. 12] 
The genesis of Contract Appeals Board can be traced to a 1868 U.S. Supreme 
Court decision that upheld an Executive Department's authority to appoint boards in 
order to administratively resolve contract disputes. 
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The original charter of the ASBCA was modified in 1962, 1969,1973, and 1979 
and currently includes the following key provisions: 
The members are required to be attorneys at law that have been qualified 
under the CDA and a designated as Administrative Judges by the 
Agency. [Ref 13] 
Decisions shall be by majority vote of the specific division hearing the 
case unless the Chairman refers the appeal to the Senior Deciding 
Group. [Ref. 13] 
The Board has the power to "hold hearings, examine witnesses, and 
receive evidence and argument for consideration and determination of the 
appeal... A member of the Board shall have authority to administer oaths 
and issue subpoenas as specified in Section 11 of the Contract Disputes 
• Act of 1978"[Ref.l3]. 
The rules governing the ASBCA were revised in 1997 in order to process the 
disputes in a timely manner. Some of the more significant rules used by ASBCA are: 
The optional accelerated procedure is available if the dispute is valued at 
$100,000 or less. There is a 180-day limit on processing time under the 
accelerated procedure and decisions are rendered by a single judge with 
concurrence of the parties. Election of the accelerated or small claims 
expedited procedures must be made within 60days of notice of docketing 
and the election may not be withdrawn without permission of the 
Board.[Ref. 13] 
The appellant may elect to have the case heard under the expedited small 
claims procedures if the dispute is valued at $50,000 or less. There is a 
120-day limit on processing time under the small claims procedure and it 
may be assigned to one judge. Perhaps the most significant feature of this 
procedure is that a, "...decision against the Government or the contractor 
shall have no value as precedent, and in the absence of fraud shall be final 
and conclusive and may not be appealed or set aside.[Ref 13] 
The Notice of Appeals must be furnished to the Board within 90-days of 
the receipt of the Contracting Officer's decision. The Board also has 
various timelines for claims based on value and complexity.[Ref. 13] 
The Board has established procedures to comply with the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA) in order to "...assist parties in adjudication of EAJA 
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applications for award of fees and other expenses incurred in connection 
with appeals of decisions...This provision is designed to assist small 
businesses that feel an appeal has merit but are concerned with the cost of 
appealing a Contracting Officer's decision.[Ref. 13] 
The ASBCA, along with the other Boards of Contract Appeals has extensive 
experience regarding Alternative Disputes Resolution (ADR) and devotes considerable 
time and effort in these "extra judicial" settlement methods. The ASBCA will use ADR 
if they are requested by both parties and can be non-binding or the parties may agree to 
make them binding if so desired. If the parties select a non-binding ADR and find its 
outcome unsatisfactory to one or both parties, the appeal will be restored and be routed 
through the ASBCA's standard procedures. 
The advantage of ADR over the other methods of dispute is reduced cost and 
time. Just as the use of a Board of Contract Appeals is less expensive and more timely 
than a suit in the Federal Court of Claims, so to is ADR less expensive and more timely 
than presenting a case for the ASBCA. The parties may also select form various methods 
including: Settlement Judge, Mini-trial, Summary Trial with Binding Decision, and Other 
Agreed Methods. 
*■»* 
The Settlement Judge method involves an Administrative Judge or Hearing 
Examiner who is appointed for the purpose of facilitating a settlement. This method 
involves a frank, in-depth discussion of each side's strengths and weaknesses in an 
attempt to elicit a compromise. The Settlement Judges recommendations are not binding, 
however, the parties can make the result binding by signing a supplemental agreement. 
The Mini-Trial is a, 
...highly flexible, -expedited, but structured procedure where each party 
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presents an abbreviated version of its position to principals of the parties 
who have full contractual authority to conclude a settlement and to a 
Board appointed neutral advisor. [Ref. 13] 
The parties determine the format of the presentation and then upon conclusion of 
the presentations commence settlement negotiations. The ASBCA advisor's 
recommendations are not binding but the parties once again, have the option of making 
their agreement binding. 
The Summary Trial with a Binding Decision is an appeal that is expedited and the 
parties try their appeal before an Administrative Judge or panel. To use this method, both 
parties must agree that he summary written decision is final, conclusive, not appeasable 
and may not be set aside, except in the case of fraud. 
The ASBCA is also open to other methods of ADR that the parties may present, 
provided the parties and the Board agrees that the proposed method is acceptable and has 
a chance to succeed. 
The ASBCA's overall philosophy can be gleaned from the final paragraph of the 
ASBCA rules: 
Generally, if the parties resolve their dispute by agreement, they benefit in 
terms of cost an time savings and maintenance or restoration of amicable 
relations...Any method adopted for dispute resolution depends upon both 
parties having a firm, good faith commitment to resolve their differences. 
Absent such intention, the best structured dispute resolution procedure is 
unlikely to be successful.[Ref. 13] 
5. United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal for the Federal Circuit is considered a 
constitutional court and is established pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, which 
states, "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme court, and 
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in   such  inferior  courts   as   the   Congress  may   from  time  to  time  ordain  and 
establish."[Ref.ll] 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is unique from other Federal Circuit 
Courts because its jurisdiction is not limited by regional boundaries but by the topics that 
it exercises its jurisdiction over: public contracts, patents, and copyrights. This 
specialized jurisdiction was created because Congress decided it was crucial to interstate 
commerce and the public well being that these issues be decided by the uniform 
application of legal principles nationwide vice on a district-by-district basis. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decides which cases merit its 
attention. 
As a result of its topical appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal for the Federal Circuit significantly reduces the number of appeals 
from such decisions to the Supreme Court. [Ref. 11] 
This court is the appeals court for the Court of Claims and the ASBCA. As the 
appellate court, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reviews the application and 
interpretation of the law by the Court of Federal Claims and the Agency Board of 
Contract Appeals, (i.e., ASBCA) but does not retry the facts of the case. 
6.        United States Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court is the highest court in the United States and as such, 
".. .reviews Government contract cases decided by the Federal Circuit only when they, at 
least potentially, would have far-reaching precedential effect and have the approval of the 
Attorney General"[Ref. 11]. As mentioned previously, Supreme Court is the 
constitutional court from whose Article III power all inferior courts are created.   The 
27 
Supreme Court is empowered to hear appellate cases that originate anywhere in the 
United States or her territories. 
To date, no case involving a best value trade-off dispute has been heard by the 
Supreme Court. 
F.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter defined best value in the context of Government procurement. This 
chapter also detailed the acquisition and contract processes and how the Government's 
decision to conduct an acquisition along the best value continuum impacts each of the 
steps. Additionally, this chapter described a protest and how GAO can impact the final 
outcome of any acquisition. Finally, this chapter described the disputes process and the 
part that ASBCA and courts play in resolution of Government contract disputes. Chapter 
III will describe the population from which the cases that will be analyzed in Chapter IV 
are drawn. Chapter III will also describe the data collection method for the cases and the 




This chapter discusses the methods used to collect the data for the case analysis 
provided in Chapter IV, as well as the methods used to gather information on the 
commercial use of best value for Chapter V. 
The population description provides a general framework of the population from 
which to draw the cases for analysis in Chapter IV, followed by the general description of 
the commercial sector companies that are most likely to have best value dealings with 
other commercial concerns and the Government. 
The sample description provides the details as to how the specific cases were 
chosen for Chapter IV and the issues they represent relative to best value. The sample 
area also gives a general description of the types of companies to be interviewed for their 
use of best value in the commercial sector and how their experience in non-government 
best value compares to their efforts in Government best value solicitations. 
B. POPULATION DESCRIPTION 
The population for this study consisted of 136 best value selection protests 
brought before the GAO; 42 best value contract disputes brought before the ASBCA; 23 
best value contract disputes brought before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims; and 5 best 
value contract appeals brought before the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from 
January 2000 to April 2001. The cases for the thesis were reviewed using the actual 
court transcripts from LEXUS/NEXUS for the 70 disputes heard by the courts and the 
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ASBCA, and the GAO recommendation for the 136 protests involving best value. The 
population includes only those cases where the adjudicating authority reached a decision 
or recommendation and does not include any cases that were settled out of court or where 
ADR was utilized to come to a negotiated agreement. 
The population did not include any cases from the U.S. Supreme Court because 
the high court has yet to hear a procurement case involving the Government's use of best 
value. The Supreme Court has heard 220 cases involving procurement, but none had best 
value as the issue in dispute. 
The population for the interviews conducted in Chapter V was considered to be 
any commercial firm that had experienced a best value selection involving the 
Government, and who used a similar concept in dealing with their commercial sector 
procurements. 
C.       SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
In order to concentrate the focus of the study and review specific cases with the 
level of detail necessary to draw meaningful conclusions on the Government's 
implementation of best value, a sample from the population was necessary. The sample 
was drawn from the population in a manner that would allow for the analysis to cover 
best value implementation in the acquisition process, specifically: the development of 
evaluation factors, the promulgation of these factors, and the awarding of the contract 
based on making the correct trade-off decisions while complying with all of the laws and 
regulations inherent in Government procurement. 
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Another consideration for selecting a case to be included in the sample was that 
the decision by the adjudicating authority was not overturned by a higher authority 
because for a decision to be overturned at the appellate level means that the trial court 
misinterpreted the application of law. The exception to this was the review of cases to be 
examined from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. As such, a case was 
chosen specifically because the appellate court had overturned the trial court. This allows 
the reader to view both sides of the legal argument through the eyes of the different 
courts and to view the same set of facts from a different perspective. 
The four cases selected include a review of a GAO protest for improper 
evaluation and solicitation; a U.S. Court of Federal Claims suit involving arbitrary and 
capricious evaluation and unfair treatment; an ASBCA case involving a best value 
solicitation and performance that led to bankruptcy of the contractor; and, a U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit case overturning a Court of Federal Claims ruling 
regarding a best value selection. 
Sample size for the interviews was two companies, one from the technology and 
service sectors of the economy and one from the service sector, who have had experience 
with Government best value, and who use a similar concept in their non-government 
dealings. 
D.       DATA COLLECTION PLAN 
The first aspect of the data collection plan involved a review of literature, 
including: books, magazines, journals, Government reports, previous theses, and Internet 
based materials to determine if there was a resource that regularly dealt with the 
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Government's implementation of best value and some of the lessons that may have been 
learned by following the decisions of recommendations of the various adjudicating 
authorities that exercise jurisdiction over the Government contract process. 
The literature review was also designed to determine how these decisions are 
currently disseminated to procurement professionals and if there were one resource that 
the procurement community could use to conduct periodic training or consult prior to 
conducting an acquisition in order to avoid repeating previous mistakes made by other 
agencies. 
The second aspect of the data collection involved the use of the library's 
LEXUS/NEXUS search engine to review the Federal Courts and Armed Services Board 
of Contract Appeals decisions where best value was an issue. LEXUS/NEXUS was also 
used to review the recommendations of the GAO regarding protests, pre- or post-award, 
where the central issue revolved around the Government's implementation or evaluation 
using best value. 
Selected decisions from the adjudicating authorities were analyzed to highlight 
the significant problems found to exist in the use of best value as the selection criteria in 
Government procurement. 
Interviews were conducted with two commercial firms to determine how they 
might be implementing best value, and if so, had they encountered any problems with its 
use in the commercial sector or from dealing with the Government on a best value 
procurement. 
The questions used in the interviews were: 
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1. Does/has your company used best value or similar concept for source 
selection in your commercial purchases? 
2. Does your company have a working definition of best value and what is 
it? 
3. Does your company use one particular evaluation factor repeatedly or does 
is vary often? 
4. What has been your experience, positive and negative, relative to your 
commercial procurements? 
5. What has been your supplier feedback? 
6. Has your company dealt with any Government procurement actions that 
involved best value and, if so, what has been your experience? 
7. What has the Government done well? 
8. What has the Government done poorly? 
9. What areas could your company have improved upon in your dealings 
with the Government in best value selections? 
10. Are there any areas; policy announcements, criteria, etc., that you feel 
would improve the Government's use of best value from the perspective of both sides? 
11. Has your industry association expressed feedback, positive or negative, on 
the Government's or commercial use of best value"? 
12. Has your company been involved in a dispute or protest? If so, what were 
the specifics and how was it resolved? 
The interviews were conducted via phone in May of 2000. 
E.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the methodology used to discover and present the cases 
detailed in Chapter IV. This chapter also described the manner in which the data for 
Chapter V were collected from commercial sources. 
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The description of the population cases and how this was reviewed in order to 
arrive at the sample cases detailed the issues that were used as discriminators in selecting 
cases that could provide lessons and insight into problems in the Government's usage of 
best value. 
This chapter also described the manner in which data were collected from the 
commercial sector, as well as providing a list of the questions presented to the companies. 
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IV.    ANALYSIS OF SELECTED CASES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A detailed analysis was conducted on the four selected cases to explore the best 
value issue that each of the cases highlighted. These four cases represent the protest and 
dispute process and the adjudicating authorities that have heard best value cases. 
Each of the cases is presented using a five-step framework. The initial step is the 
summary presentation of the finding of fact; the second and third steps are a synopsis of 
the parties' arguments. Fourth, the applicable policy and interpretation of the 
adjudicating authority is detailed. The final step details the conclusions and lessons that 
can be drawn from each of the cases, noting the difference in best value policy 
interpretation and execution for the cases found in favor of the contractor; and noting the 
correct usage of best value in the case of the COFD being upheld. 
B. CASE ANALYSIS 
1.        Case 1 - Meridian Management Corporation versus General Services 
Administration 
a. Summary of Case 1 Facts 
This case involves a bid protest heard by GAO brought by Meridian 
Management Corporation claiming that the General Services Administration (GSA) may 
not exclude a technically acceptable proposal from the competitive range without 
considering that proposal's price and that the solicitation failed to put offerers on notice 
that they would be required to perform specialized operations in laboratories. 
GSA had solicited proposals for, 
...a base period (of 12 months) and two option periods (of 12 and 36 
35 
months, respectively) to operate and maintain the mechanical, electrical, 
utility, and interior and exterior architectural/structural (A/S) system in the 
four facilities...The solicitation provided for award to the offeror whose 
proposal represented the best value to the Government in terms of the total 
evaluated price, experience, and past performance.[Ref. 14] 
The evaluation criteria in the proposal noted that past performance and 
experience combined would be more important than price, but as proposals became more 
equal, price on these issues would probably become more important. 
After receipt of all the proposals, the Contracting Officer determined that 
there were too many highly rated proposals for an efficient negotiation and limited the 
competitive range by eliminating all proposals except those with the highest past 
performance and experience scores and the lowest prices because competitors outside this 
range were not deemed to have a reasonable chance to be awarded the contract. 
Meridian's proposal had met the price standard to be included in the 
competitive range, but fell short in the experience and past performance evaluation 
criteria and thus, Meridian was not included in the competitive range, prompting this 
protest to GAO. 
b. Meridian Management Corporation's Protest 
Meridian argued that GSA's assigned past performance scores of "not 
applicable" in an area where they lacked experience and then incorrectly included that 
score as part of the overall score as it may have unfairly penalized Meridian. The 
Contracting Officer agreed that the scores for all offerors without laboratory experience 
needed to be recalculated, but found that, "Although Meridian's score improved ...as a 
result of the re-scoring, the scores of all the other offerors improved as well, leading the 
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Contracting Officer to raise the cutoff for inclusion in the competitive range" [Ref. 14]. 
This change in the competitive range excluded Meridian even with their adjusted 
experience and past performance scores.   Meridian argued "...it was improper for the 
agency to exclude it from the competitive range without any consideration of its 
price"[Ref.l4].  Meridian argued that the Government's own rules, FAR 15.304 (c) (1) 
required that cost or price to the Government must be included in every RFP as an 
evaluation factor, and that agencies are required to consider cost or price to the 
Government in evaluating competitive proposals [Ref.2]. The contractor argued that this 
requirement means that an agency can not exclude a proposal that is technically 
acceptable without taking into account the relative cost or price of the proposal. 
Meridian argued that even after the re-scoring of the best value evaluation factors of 
experience and past performance, the Government eliminated them from the competitive 
range without taking the cost or price into account as required by the FAR. 
The agency gave no consideration to the fact that Meridian's price...was 
considerably lower that that of one of the competitive range offerors 
whose technical score, while above the cutoff, nevertheless was very close 
to Meridian's score.[Ref. 14] 
Meridian also argued that the solicitation failed to inform the offerors that 
the contract would require them to perform specialized operation and maintenance 
services in the laboratories. Meridian argued that GSA's unwillingness to allow the 
offerors to visually inspect the laboratories denied them the ability to determine if there 
was any equipment present that would require specialized service. Meridian's proposal 
did not specifically address the special requirements, because they were unaware of this 
portion of the requirement; and although Meridian did not disagree with the COFD, in 
that laboratories require complex services, they asserted that if GSA expected the 
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awardee to perform these specialized tasks then the solicitation should have defined the 
specialized requirements. Meridian contends that had the specialized requirements been 
a part of the solicitation they would have modified their proposal to address the 
requirement. 
c.        GSA 's Response 
GSA responded to the protestor's accusation that the requirement was not 
completely defined in the solicitation by stating that offerers were placed on notice of the 
specialized requirement in the laboratories. The GSA solicitation called for the contract 
awardee to provide service in the Drug Enforcement Agency, Environmental Protection 
Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation laboratories located in the Federal 
buildings. The GSA Contracting Officer also contended that the offerers were allowed to 
tour the buildings, excluding the laboratories, and to raise concerns about the 
specification prior to submitting a proposal. 
GSA contended that its solicitation met the minimum requirement. 
A procuring agency must provide sufficient information in the solicitation 
to enable offerers to compete intelligently and on a relatively equal 
basis....An agency can accomplish this by furnishing offerors with 
sufficiently detailed information in the solicitation or, to the extent the 
agency is unable to furnish the necessary level of detail, by giving offerors 
the opportunity to obtain such information on their own through site 
visits.[Ref. 14] 
GSA contended that all parties were allowed to visit the sites and were 
granted access to all areas except two of the laboratories, but they were allowed to ask 
questions regarding the specialized equipment. The solicitation further pointed out the 
temperature and humidity levels must remain constant and that the laboratories operated 
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d GAO's Findings and Recommendation 
GAO concluded that GSA was in error when it failed to consider the price 
of each proposal, when the Contracting Officer used only experience and past 
performance as the criteria for determining those offerers who would remain in the 
competitive range. 
GAO also determined that the RFP was not specific enough as to the type 
and scope of work to be performed in the laboratories, and did not make adequate 
provisions for potential offerers to be able discover the overall requirement. 
GAO upheld the protest and recommended that GSA amend the RFP to 
include the specialized laboratory requirements. GAO also recommended that in making 
the new competitive range determination, GSA take experience, past performance and 
price into consideration. 
The digest of the GAO ruling was, 
Agency may not exclude a technically acceptable proposal from the 
competitive range without taking into account that proposal's price. 
Solicitation for operations and maintenance services at two federal 
buildings and two parking facilities did not put the offerer on notice that 
they would be required to perform specialized operations and maintenance 
services in laboratories housed in those buildings, given that the 
solicitation did not in any way refer to the specialized services and 
offerers were not given the opportunity to visually inspect the laboratories 
themselves to determine whether equipment requiring specialized service 
was present. [Ref. 14] 
39 
GAO also recommended that GSA reimburse the protestor for the costs of 
filing and pursuing the protest, to include reasonable legal fees in accordance with 
GAO's Bid Protest Regulations. 
e. Conclusions from Meridian 
It was determined that GAO correctly concluded that GSA was in error 
when it failed to consider the price of Meridian's proposal after the re-scoring had 
brought the experience and past performance scores so close to the competitive range. 
There was concurrence with GAO's assertion that GSA had failed to follow the legal 
requirement to ensure that price or cost is always evaluated in considering competitive 
proposals. GAO was also correct in determining that the RFP was not specific enough as 
to the type and scope of work to be performed in the laboratories. 
The glaring omission from GAO's finding was its failure to reconcile 
GSA's evaluation criteria as spelled out in the RFP with the method used by the 
Contracting Officer to apply it. The RFP stated that as past performance and experience 
scores got relatively tighter, price would become a more important evaluation factor. 
However, in practice, the Contracting Officer attempted to eliminate Meridian despite the 
relatively tight experience and past performance scores with an offeror in the competitive 
range without giving any consideration to the Meridian's price advantage. Hence, the 
conclusion that GAO failed to point out that GSA had failed to follow the evaluation 
criteria they had listed in their own RFP. 
If GSA had written the RFP so that the competitive range had been 
determined by some fixed combination of past performance, experience, and price; they 
could have possibly avoided this protest.   The fact that GSA did not follow its own 
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procedure could lead to the perception that they were acting in an arbitrary and capricious 
manner. It appears that GAO was correct to recommend the revision to the RFP, but that 
GSA should have revisited the source selection plan to determine how they were truly 
going to evaluate offerors so that a complete and accurate plan could have been used to 
alert potential offerors as to the relative importance of the various evaluation factors. 
2. Case 2 - Ryder Move Management Inc. v. United States and 
Associates Relocation Management Company Inc., Cendant Mobility, 
Interstate Relocation Service Inc., and The Pasha Group. 
a.        Summary of Case 2 Facts 
This case is a post-award suit brought before the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims by Ryder Move Management in an attempt to force the Government to reopen the 
bid process because the plaintiffs financial risk was incorrectly evaluated and that the 
Government had not conducted a best value trade-off analysis. 
The Department of Defense was pursuing its Full Service Moving Project 
(FSMP) with seven separate contracts for commercial move management and relocation 
services. Ryder filed this suit seeking an injunction against DoD to stop it from 
proceeding with the contract awards and to force it to reopen the competitive bid process 
due to its alleged failure to conduct a proper procurement. Thereafter, The Pasha Group; 
Associates Relocation Management Company Inc.; Cendant Mobility; and Interstate 
Relocation Service Inc. petitioned the court, and were granted, to intervene. All of the 
intervenees were awarded one of the seven contracts. 
Ryder filed an amended complaint in search of a preliminary injunction to 
order DoD to cease issuing work orders against the contracts until resolution of the suit. 
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The court conferred with the parties and reached agreement so the preliminary injunction 
and case resolution could be completed expeditiously. 
The suit originates with the Army's FSMP, which was an attempt to 
streamline the movement of service-members household goods in conjunction with 
permanent change of duty station orders. The Army Communications Electronics 
Command (CECOM) had the lead in designing the acquisition plan and then 
implementing the program. 
At the pre-solicitation conference, the Contracting Officer informed the 
potential offerors that the Army would use Dunn & Bradstreet (D&B) to provide analysis 
for the financial risk assessment portion of the proposal evaluation. A representative 
from D&B was on hand and informed all potential offerors that they were welcome to 
review the data D&B had on file for each of the companies. D&B was a recognized 
expert in the field of commercial business financial analysis and had been providing 
similar services to the General Services Administration and other Government agencies. 
The FSMP RFP was actually two RFP's, one competitive solicitation for 
household goods transportation and one competitive solicitation for move management 
services.   The move management solicitation required the offerer to submit a proposal 
volume for past performance/experience, financial data, overall technical proposal, 
technical statement of requirements, price, and a small business subcontracting plan. 
The FSMP solicitation provided a description of the factors and subfactors 
that would be evaluated, and the basis upon which the award would be 
made... Offerors were advised that 'any award(s) to be made will based on 
the best overall (i.e., best value) proposal that is determined to be the most 
beneficial to the Government, with appropriate consideration given to the 
four evaluation factors: Overall Performance Risk, Technical, Statements 
of Requirements,  and  Price.'     The  overall performance risk factor 
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consisted of two subfactors of equal weight: past performance risk and 
financial risk. Potential offerers were informed via the solicitation that the 
overall performance risk factor would be the most significant factor. [Ref. 
15] 
The Army issued six amendments to the solicitation clarifying the Army 
requirement for the financial risk subfactor, including an assessment of the offerer's 
"profitability, liquidity, and solvency"[Ref. 15]. The RFP also stated that a consolidated 
financial package could be submitted if the offerer were a corporate subsidiary and it 
provided the required format for such a submission. Ryder offered a performance 
guarantee letter from its corporate parent, Budget group Inc. 
The RFP also required that each company submit a separate proposal for 
each of the 10 geographic areas of the countries, called Statements of Requirements 
(SOR). DoD received a total of 21 proposals, with Ryder bidding on seven SOR and 
several of the other offerers submitting proposals on more than ones SOR. Ryder also 
submitted a letter informing the Government and D&B that they would be submitting the 
financial data from their parent, Budget, because Ryder "...lacked stand-alone public 
financial statements"[Ref. 15]. 
D&B completed a financial risk analysis based on Budget's submission 
for Ryder and other information available to them. One data point was a comparison of 
Ryder and the competitors in their market. For the purpose of this analysis D&B had 
classified Ryder as a local trucking and storage company vice the classification of the 
Budget Group. The D&B analysis rated Ryder as a "moderate" financial risk on the basis 
of comparing Budget's liquidity, operating profit (a lose in the case of Budget), and debt 
to equity ratio compared to other local trucking and storage companies. 
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During the Contracting Officer's evaluation, 15 items for negotiation or 
communication were brought to the attention of Ryder by the Contracting Officer, 
however, none were related to D&B's rating of Ryder as a moderate financial risk. DoD 
evaluated Ryder's proposal in accordance with the steps spelled out in the RFP and rated 
them favorably in the areas of technical, SORs, and price, but rated Ryder as "moderate" 
for the overall performance risk with specific concerns about Budget's unfavorable 
leverage ratio, net loss, and debt to equity ratio. 
The Source Selection Authority, in this case, the Contracting Officer, 
awarded the 10 SORs to companies that had been evaluated as providing the best value to 
the Government. All of the awardees had received grades of "low" during the 
performance risk evaluation. In the final evaluation, the Contracting Officer had 
eliminated all offerers with low performance risk grades from further consideration for 
the award. 
The Contracting Officer debriefed Ryder to inform them why they had not 
been selected and pointed out that Ryder had not been considered for the award because 
they had been graded as a "moderate" performance risk, and only offerers with grades of 
low risk had been selected. 
Ryder had initially challenged the award of the contract through the GAO 
protest process. However, Ryder subsequently withdrew its protest with GAO and 
commenced its suit before the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Four of the awardees; 
Pasha, Associates, Cendant, and Interstate were granted motion to intervene. 
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b.        Ryder's Claim 
Ryder's claim involves four claims of missteps by the Government that 
may lead to the Court to grant injunctive relief. First, the Contracting Officer may be 
considered arbitrary and capricious in evaluating Ryder's financial risk. Second, the 
failure of the Contracting Officer to raise the issue of financial condition is evidence that 
there might be a failure to conduct meaningful discussions. Third, Ryder claimed that 
even with a risk of "moderate" they should have been evaluated on the overall package as 
part of the best value trade-off analysis. Finally, Ryder claimed that the Contracting 
Officer unfairly treated their proposal because she had given Pasha a "low" overall 
performance risk despite having graded them as a "moderate" financial risk. 
Ryder's primary contention was that the Contracting Officer was arbitrary 
and capricious in her evaluation of the financial condition of Ryder, which had used the 
financial information of the parent company, Budget. Ryder supported this contention 
with affidavits that pointed out that if the Contracting Officer had evaluated the Budget 
financial data against other companies in the car rental business, she would have seen that 
the debt to equity ratio was within the range of other car rental companies. The affidavits 
also pointed out that a detailed examination of the loss suffered by the Budget Group 
would have revealed that it was the result of certain one-time charges unique to the car 
rental marketplace. Ryder contends that D&B incorrectly evaluated their risk by not 
comparing the Budget Group data to similar car rental companies, and that if the 
evaluation had been done correctly, they would have been graded as a "low" performance 
risk. 
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Ryder's second assertion was that the Contracting officer failed to conduct 
meaningful discussions, because she failed to bring to light any concerns over the 
financial condition of Ryder or ask for clarification on any of the provided information. 
Ryder's third concern revolved around their claim that the Contracting 
Officer made a fatal error by eliminating 5 offerers, Ryder included, from the competitive 
range, because all five had been graded as "moderate" performance risks. Ryder 
contends that from the competitive range should have been brought forward to final 
consideration under the best value trade-off analysis. Ryder contended that by 
eliminating the "moderate" risk companies prior to performing the best value trade off 
analysis, the Contracting Officer had violated the evaluation criteria spelled out in the 
RFP. 
Ryder's final contention was that the Contracting Officer had treated them 
unfairly relative to another offeror whose marks had warranted a grade of "moderate" 
performance risk, but who had received a grade of "low" from the Contracting Officer 
and been awarded one of the contracts. As proof of the unfair treatment, Ryder pointed 
out that Pasha had received the same scores as Ryder in the two subfactors that 
comprised overall performance risk, yet Ryder was graded as "moderate" and Pasha was 
upgraded to "low" risk. Ryder alleged that unequal grading proved the Contracting 
Officer was biased against them and failed to conduct a fair and impartial evaluation. 
c.        CECOM's Response 
CECOM countered Ryder's allegations through a declaration that the 
Contracting Officer had, 
...performed  a trade-off analysis,  which encompassed  each  of the 
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proposals-including plaintiffs (Ryder's) proposal-within the competitive 
range for each of the 10 individual Statements of Requirements. In doing 
so, I considered the Overall Performance Risk assessment, the Technical 
and Statement of Requirements Factor ratings and the evaluated price for 
each offeror.[Ref 15] 
The Government also had to correct the record because of a transcription 
error that had listed the industry profit norm as +7.0% whereas 2.4% was the correct 
figure. This came to light as a result of the Government reviewing the record for the suit, 
comparing Ryder's proposal against industry norms. However, the declaration contended 
that the correct number was used by D&B in its analysis and thus the overall performance 
risk grade of "moderate" was correct and not impacted by the transcription error. 
In response to Ryder's claim that the risk evaluation was incorrect, 
because D&B had compared Budget's financial situation against the wrong peer group, 
the Government pointed to the fact that the offerers were told the financial information 
was going to be compared against the primary industry category of the offerer. Since 
Ryder was the offerer, not the Budget Group, the Government contended that D&B 
correctly used this as the financial submission for Ryder since they had no independent 
financial statements of their own. D&B therefore was correct to use Budget's data to 
compare Ryder against its primary industry classification and not the industry 
classification of the parent company. The Government pointed out that they had acted 
consistently in this manner, because Ryder was not the only offerer to submit the 
financial data of its parent company and each company was treated the same. 
The Government's response to Ryder's claim that the failure to raise the 
issue of financial risk during discussions indicates a failure to conduct meaningful 
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discussions was that the Government only needs to consider elements that are relevant to 
potentially deficient or ambiguous information contained in the proposal. The 
Government points out that the purpose of the discussions is to advise offerer's within the 
competitive range of deficiencies in the information provided in their proposals to give 
them the opportunity to alter or clarify in order to meet the Government's requirements, 
the,"...scope and extent of these discussion are a matter of contracting officer 
judgment"[Ref. 15]. The Government contended that the financial data was not 
considered to be deficient or unclear by the Contracting Officer, and that Ryder did not 
challenge the data but only DoD's interpretation of the data. The Government's stance 
was that the FAR does not require discussions to include the opinions that are drawn 
form data. 
The Government countered Ryder's third assertion, that the Contracting 
Officer had erroneously excluded them from the best value trade-off analysis, by stating 
the record showed that all offeror's were given appropriate consideration but that the 
finalists were comprised of those companies that were graded as a "low" performance 
risk. The Contracting Officer's affidavit pointed that the finalist's proposals had been 
compared to the others, Ryder included, and that the finalists were the only ones that 
warranted further consideration. The Government pointed out that the RFP had been 
clear in indicating that performance risk was the most important evaluation factor. 
In countering Ryder's contention that they had been treated unfairly, 
because Pasha had received the same scores, but had been graded "low" risk, the 
Government stated Contracting Officer used sound business judgment and evaluated each 
fairly.      Specifically,   the  Government  showed  that there  were  items  of distinct 
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disadvantage in Ryder's proposal that were not present in Pasha's: profitability, past 
performance, and debt to equity ratio. In all of these key factors Ryder was significantly 
below the peer norms, while Pasha was close to the norms. In the Contracting Officer's 
judgment, these factors meant that Pasha's proposal represented a "low" performance 
risk. 
The Government countered each of the claims leveled by Ryder through 
the use of the contract record, a correction, a declaration, and an affidavit to demonstrate 
that they had followed the RFP and acted in a fair and consistent manner. 
d. Court of Federal Claims Decision 
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims found that the Contracting Officer's 
evaluation was, "...not unlawful or irrational"[Ref. 15]. The Court found in the 
Government's favor, denied Ryder's injunction request and deemed each party 
responsible for its own costs. In its response, the Court specifically ruled on each of 
Ryder's contentions so that a precedent could be set or reaffirmed across all issues before 
the Court. The Court noted for the record that the aggrieved bidder must prove that there 
was no rational basis for the agency's decision and that the Court may not substitute its 
judgment for the agency's, but may determine if that judgment was, "...the result of a 
considered process, rather than an arbitrary and capricious choice based on factor lacking 
any intrinsic rational basis"[Ref. 15]. 
Also, the Court ruled that the Contracting Officer was not irrational in 
comparing Ryder's submitted financial data, actually Budget's data, to companies in the 
peer group of the offeror and that the Government was consistent in that it followed the 
same process for Cendant and Associates.  The fact that D&B could have evaluated the 
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financial data in a different manner does not by itself mean that the way they did evaluate 
it was not based on a rational process. Ryder failed to show that D&B's evaluation was 
plainly wrong nor did Ryder prove that even if another method of comparison had been 
used that they would have been assured a performance risk grade of "low." For these 
reasons, the Court ruled that the D&B risk evaluation was not irrational. 
The Court ruled that Ryder's claim ofthat the Contracting Officer failed to 
conduct meaningful discussions because she failed to bring the financial risk question to 
the forefront was within the scope of her judgment. The Court agreed that the 
discussions designed to clarify data are quite separate from discussions regarding any 
opinions drawn from the data and ruled that the Contracting officer was under no 
obligation to discuss items which were not subject to correction. Ryder did not object to 
the data itself, but only to the conclusions drawn from that data. The Court had 
previously stated, they would not substitute, their own judgment for that of the agency 
provided the agency's is rooted in a rational basis. 
The Court found the affidavit provided by the Government when taken in 
context of the entire record does represent that the Government acted in a consistent 
manner with respect to the evaluation factors and conducted a best value trade-off 
analysis for all offerors in the competitive range. The Court explained the allowing of the 
Government's affidavit and declaration by stating, "While the Court looks most heavily 
to the agency's contemporaneous record of the decision-making process, the court may 
consider post-protest explanations"[Ref. 15]. The Court found that the record and the 
post-award statements proved to its satisfaction that the best value trade-off analysis had 
been completed. 
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The Court found that the Government had treated all parties fairly and did 
not demonstrate the bias claimed by Ryder by ranking Pasha as a "low" performance risk 
and Ryder as a "moderate" performance risk despite both companies receiving the same 
two subfactors that made up performance risk. The Court ruled that the Contracting 
Officer had used her business judgment in weighting the mitigating factors of Pasha's 
proposal to determine that they were a "low" performance risk. The Court did not 
second-guess that judgment but rather found that she had a reasonable premise for the 
decision. 
Based on all of these factors, the Court of Federal Claims found that the 
award of the contract had been proper and found in favor of the Government. 
e. Conclusions from Ryder 
It was determined that the court was correct in its decision and the 
evaluation of the facts of the case. However, this case did highlight a few areas where 
CECOM could have done some things to improve the process and potentially avoid the 
time and cost of the suit. 
One of the areas where CECOM could have improved was in the pre- 
solicitation research, and overall design and communication of the performance risk 
evaluation. Even though the Court found nothing wrong with the way CECOM 
conducted itself in this area, detailed market research would have revealed that there was 
going to be some problems with the companies that had no independent financial data. 
D&B offered to show the potential offerors the data the D&B had on each of their 
companies, however the process used did fail to take into account some unique 
characteristics of Budget's business. This left Ryder under the impression they were not 
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treated fairly, which is contrary to one of the goals of Federal procurement, which is to 
treat all parties fairly and reasonably and to be perceived as doing business this way. 
It appears that the Contracting Officer also failed to correctly document 
the file and this led to some of the perception problem. The fact that CECOM had to 
enter a correction to the documentation as it sat before the court, and that the Contracting 
Officer had to enter an affidavit to explain the reasoning behind her inclusion of Pasha 
and rejection of Ryder despite them both having been graded as "moderate" performance 
is an indication that the file could not stand on its own and needed further amplification. 
The error of showing the industry average profit at 7% and then having to change it 2.4% 
during the proceeding is particularly troubling, because profit was one of the criteria used 
to eliminate Ryder from the competitive range. This case demonstrates the critical need 
to document the file so the decisions and the logic used to arrive at them can be 
determine by an adjudicating authority without additional input from the Contracting 
Officer. 
3. Case 3 - Stratos Mobile Networks USA v. United States Navy and 
COMSAT Corporation 
a. Summary of Case 3 Facts 
This case was an appeal heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit of a case originally heard by the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. The Court 
of Federal Claims had found that the Government procurement was illegal and granted a 
summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants, U.S. Navy and COMSAT 
Corporation, "...sought a review of the judgment of the Untied States Court of Federal 
Claims, concluding that defendant United States' solicitation of a contract was 
improperly conducted and ordering injunctive relief'[Ref. 16]. 
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The lower court, the Court of Federal Claims, found the procurement 
illegal, because the Request for Proposal (RFP) contained a latent ambiguity regarding 
the manner in which the bids were to be evaluated. The lower court had issued an 
injunction requiring the Navy to rewrite the RFP, re-bid the contract, and transition the 
contract to the Plaintiff, Stratos, if the plaintiff won the re-bid. 
In March of 1999 the Navy's Space and Naval Warfare Command 
(SPAWAR) issued a RFP for an indefinite-delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract 
for the procurement of leased satellite-based communication services through the 
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT) service. 
The RFP stated under the evaluation sector: 
The Government will award a contract...to the responsible offerer whose 
offer conforming to the solicitation...will be most advantageous to the 
Government, price and other factors considered...the award will be made 
to the offerer whose proposal meets the minimum technical requirements 
and offers the best value to the Government in terms combination of past 
performance and price...Prices will also be evaluated for reasonableness 
using the items not-to-exceed quantities... In considering the 
reasonableness and realism of the price proposals, the Government may 
determine that an offer is unacceptable if the prices proposed are 
materially unbalanced between line items...an offer is unbalanced when: 
one it is based on prices significantly less in cost for some work and prices 
are significantly overstated in relation to the cost for other work; and two, 
if there is reasonable doubt that the offer will result in the low overall cost 
the Government even though it may be the lowest evaluated offer, or it is 
so unbalanced as to be tantamount to allowing an advance payment.[Ref. 
16] 
The RFP stated that the price evaluation would be based on the anticipated 
order amounts found in the RFP, but these estimates in no way shall be construed as 
obligating the Government to place orders in strict compliance with these estimates, as a 
matter of law the Government is only obligated to purchase up to the minimum quantity 
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of an DDIQ contract. The RFP also informed potential offerers that the Government 
would be taking any discounts that were offered and applicable in the price evaluation 
determination "...without regard to the number of channels ordered or without regard to 
the number of months funded by the Government"[Ref. 16]. The RFP also included an 
example on one way of structuring the discounts but did not require that the discounts 
had to be structured in this manner. 
Stratos and COMSAT submitted proposals in accordance with the RFP 
and both satisfied the technical requirements, as well as received grades of excellent in 
the past performance section of the evaluation. The structure of the discounts differed 
greatly in the proposals and this is where the award was finally decided. 
Stratos had structured their discounts in such a manner that the Navy 
would get the discounted price only after it had built up a specified channel-month 
ordering amount. The structure of Stratos' discount was such that the Navy had to match 
or exceed the anticipated amounts given in the solicitation, any amount short of the 
anticipated quantity reset the cumulative counter to zero and made it more difficult to 
reach a discount point in the follow on month. In other words, Stratos' discount was tied 
directly to the anticipated amounts shown in the solicitation and the Navy would receive 
a discount only if it exceeded those anticipated amounts. 
COMSAT's discount structure followed the example set forth in the RFP 
and calculated the discount based on the annual usage and thus was dependent only on 
the quantity ordered over a 12-month period. 
Upon receipt of the proposals, the Navy sought to clarify the pricing and 
discount structure of Stratos. The Navy also informed Stratos that it could not prepay for 
54 
service, which was one of the conditions Stratos had imposed for the Navy to be eligible 
for discounts. Stratos submitted a revised proposal, to which the Navy responded: 
...it appears that the discounts you are offering ...apply to the exact 
anticipated quantities included in the RFP for price evaluation. Although 
the price evaluation quantities constitute a reasonable estimate of future 
order quantities, it is impossible to predict exact order quantities over the 
five-year ordering period. Accordingly, the RFP advised that evaluation 
of the anticipated order amounts would not obligate the Government to 
place orders in that manner.[Ref 16] 
Based on the final proposals submitted, the price for the anticipated 
quantity was $65,254,030 for COMSAT and $64,221,920 for Stratos. At the upper limit, 
the not-to-exceed-price for COMSAT was $111,951,000 and $126,100,800 for Stratos. 
The Navy awarded the contract to COMSAT based on its evaluation that 
the COMSAT discount structure was more flexible, and thus, more advantageous to the 
Government because the uncertainty of the IDIQ quantities would allow the Navy to 
realize lower expected costs with COMSAT's more flexible discount structure. 
The Navy justified the award because COMSAT's undiscounted price was 
lower than Stratos'; Stratos' lower evaluated price was entirely dependent on the Navy 
ordering in the same manner as the anticipated quantities; the restricted conditions for 
receiving the Stratos discounts were unlikely to materialize; COMSAT's discounts were 
a better value to the Government because they were more flexible; and, the not-to-exceed 
price difference of $14,149,800 at the upper limit significantly favored COMSAT. 
b. Stratos Mobile Networks' Claim 
Stratos challenged the Navy's evaluation in the U.S. Court of Federal 
Claims, by stating that the RFP's direction was not followed, specifically, that the Navy 
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failed to follow RFP directions to evaluate the prices based strictly on the anticipated 
order amounts set forth in the RFP for the very purpose of evaluating prices. 
Stratos also challenged the evaluation of specific evaluation of 
COMSAT'S past performance as being graded excellent in spite of evidence to the 
contrary. 
c        Navy and COMSA T Response 
The Navy emphasized the negative impact on national security if it was 
forced to re-bid the contract and subsequently change from COMSAT to Stratos in the 
middle of the five-year performance period. 
COMSAT, as co-defendant, rebutted Stratos' assertion as to any 
significant issues in their past performance that would have negated the evaluation of 
excellent they have received from the Navy. 
The Navy and COMSAT argued that the RFP had clearly pointed out that 
the Navy would also evaluate the "reasonableness and realism" of the proposals to 
determine the probability that the best value would be achieved under each of the 
proposals. 
d Court of Federal Claims Decision 
The Court of Federal Claims, the trial court, agreed with the Navy's 
assertion that "...it was in the best interest of national security that the Navy 
have...continuous, uninterrupted access to INMARSAT-B..."[Ref. 16]. However, the 
lower court found that the Navy had abused its discretion, and its awarding the contract to 
COMSAT had been arbitrary and capricious because it had not more closely followed the 
RFP in evaluating price. 
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The lower court had issued an injunction to require the Navy to rewrite the 
RFP, re-bid and re-evaluate the contract, and if Stratos won the new competition, to 
transition service to Stratos in one year. This injunction, "...discounted the national 
security threat posed by forced service transition, but sought to mitigate any such harm 
by delaying any transition to permit expedited appeal"[Ref 16]. 
e. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Decision 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the appellate court, reviewed 
the lower courts decision based on an appeal and found that, 
The RFP had to be read in of its purpose and consistently with common 
sense. The court held that, based on the nature of the indefinite-delivery, 
indefinite-quantity contract and the specific terms of the RFP, there was 
no ambiguity in the RFP, latent or otherwise, and therefore no error 
sufficient to justify judgment for the plaintiff. Thus the court reversed the 
judgment and vacated the injunction. [Ref. 16] 
The appellate court found no ambiguity in the RFP, that it was clear in 
stating that the Government was looking for best value in terms of price and past 
performance. However, the RFP was equally clear of the anticipated amounts to be used 
for price evaluation purposes and that they in no way bound the Government to order any 
more than the minimum quantity. The appellate court also found that the trial court had 
erred by reading the contractual provision for evaluating a price based on the anticipated 
quantities without the benefit of the entire context of the contract. The court found that in 
order to determine the true intent of the Government, a complete reading of the RFP was 
necessary and the entire evaluation scheme needed to be applied to the facts. When the 
court did this they found that while the price determination at the anticipated price was a 
consideration, "...nothing in the RFP makes that consideration exclusive, and the RFP 
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makes clear that the lowest evaluated offer need not be accepted 'if there is reasonable 
doubt that the offer will result in the lowest overall cost to the Government.. ."[Ref. 16]. 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit found that Navy's award of 
the contract to COMSAT was not arbitrary or capricious and had been done in 
accordance with the law. 
/ Conclusions from Stratos 
This case clearly represents the need to have legal advice intimately 
involved in the acquisition process in order to give advise to the Contracting Officer, 
SSA, SSAC, and SSEB as to how certain decisions can be interpreted by the courts. The 
attorney's must make themselves familiar with not only the precedents that have been set, 
but also the tone the court has taken with regard to recent decisions on issues that may be 
similar to the current best value acquisition. Since best value involves the Government 
making a judgment, that judgment must be backed up with reasoning that can withstand 
the scrutiny of the judicial branch. The primary concern in this case is that two courts 
can hear the same set of facts and yet arrive at totally opposite decisions. 
It appears the only thing that may have improved the Navy's already 
strong in the trial court was if the RFP had stated that the offeror's proposals would be 
evaluated using weighted net present value costs to the Government at the minimum, 
anticipated, maximum, and four other quantities based on the probabilities ofthat level of 
usage. This RFP would then have been backed up by an evaluation plan that would have 
weighted the max, min, anticipated, and four other amounts based on a predetermined 
scale, removing any leeway for the trial court to find a latent defect. This evaluation plan 
would also have forced each of the offeror's to provide the best possible value over the 
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spectrum of alternative quantities, because they would not have know the weighting 
factors.  This plan would have insulated the Navy from the claim of an ambiguous RFP 
and potentially eliminated Stratos' suit. 
4. Case 4 - Defense Systems Company, Inc. vs. United States Army 
a.        Summary of Case 4 Facts 
This case involves the termination of a best value contract, brought before 
the ASBCA in June 2000, because of a contractor claim that the Government breached 
the contract in bad faith, which led to the demise of Defense Systems Company, Inc. 
(DSC) as a viable concern. The claim by DSC seeks to recover $72M for the breach and 
other damages detailed in the case. 
This case centers on the HYDRA-70 rocket, the most widely used rocket 
in the world. The rocket is composed of three primary components: the rocket motor, the 
warhead, and the fuse. These components were assembled by a Load, Assembly, and 
Pack (LAP) contractor, but the program had always been managed by the Army, most 
recently the Army Industrial Operations Command (IOC-Rock Island). The procurement 
and quality assurance were collocated at Rock Island with the program office, while the 
design agent for the warheads and fuses was the Army Research Development and 
Engineering Center (ARDEC) at the Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey. The design agent 
for the warhead was the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC) in Indian Head, 
Maryland. 
The Army Material Command had directed its subordinate command; 
IOC-Rock Islands to procure the Hydra-70 rockets as a system in order to shift the 
administrative and logistical burden for the component contractors from the Government 
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to one contractor, who would then be responsible for the entire system. In 1991, IOC- 
Rock Island had issued a request for unpriced technical proposals to be submitted in order 
for the Army to decide which proposal's would meet the technical requirements for the 
Hydra-70 rocket without the contractor being required to submit detailed pricing data. 
From those contractors who submitted acceptable proposals, the Army requested price 
proposals for each of the eight line items. The RFP called for 232,764 rockets, motors, 
and warheads and had three option periods attached so that the Government could extend 
the period of the contract based on the assessed performance of the awardee. 
Based on the Army's assessment of the unpriced proposals, two 
companies were requested to submit pricing proposals in order for the Army to select an 
awardee. The two remaining offerer's were DSC and Hercules/CMS, which was a joint 
venture of Hercules Inc. and Conventional Munitions Systems. 
DSC, a wholly owned subsidiary of BEI Electronics, Inc., was founded in 
1952 in Arkansas and was considered a "one product line, one customer company"[Ref. 
17]. Since this was the only business DSC was in, they decided this contract was a "must 
win" and developed the pricing strategy to "bid low as low as it could and work itself out 
of the hole"[Ref. 17]. This strategy was based on DSC's need to win the contract and 
DSC's expectation that Hercules/CMS would have a very aggressive pricing strategy in 
order to win the contract. 
This strategy was reflected in a pre-bid briefing DSC gave to the officers 
and directors of its parent, BEI...A briefing chart entitled "competitive 
assessment HYDAR-70 Bid Scenarios" showed that DSC believed that if 
it were to bid S179M, its confidence level in winning the contract was 
only 20 percent. Its confidence level progressively increased to 60, 90, 
and 100 percent with a progressively lower bid of $169M, $159M,'and 
$ 149M respectively. [Ref. 17] 
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DSC's confidence that a bid of $149M would guarantee the contract 
award to them was predicated on the assumption that Hercules/CMS would not bid below 
the probable DSC manufacturing costs. DSC also assumed that they could use "mistakes 
and corporate muscle to regain profitability via Government and suppliers"[Ref. 17]. The 
mistakes would entail defining the errors in the TDP and charging the Government for 
the engineering effort to correct the TDP and to change the process. A chart at the pre- 
bid briefing given to the company officers showed that if DSC won at a price of $149M, 
they would have to take several steps to make it a profitable endeavor, including: 
1. Looking for mistakes in the Technical Data Package and charge the 
Government to correct it. 
2. Set the stage for later protests that he option structure of the contract was 
an improper vehicle for this acquisition. 
3. Work on contract modifications to allow separate billing of the pre- 
production evaluation effort. 
4. Propose a facility/storage contract or modification to the existing contract 
that would become effective after the delivery of the existing backlog. 
5. Work vigorously on business development/cost reduction plans. [Ref. 17] 
DSC's internal estimate on the cost to perform the technical aspects of 
their offer was $181M, or $32M above the $149M price they were going to offer for the 
eight line items in the contract. DSC was confident that it could recoup some of this 
$32M shortfall through correcting a problem with the fuse and Ram Air Deflector (RAD) 
that DSC had previously become aware of when performing as a subcontractor for 
another Hydra-70 component contractor. DSC believed that the Government's Technical 
Data Package (TDP) contained an error that led to this specific problem, and could 
possibly recover by making the correction and charging the Government for the 
modification. 
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Another set of key assumptions DSC made regarding the contract involved 
the length and breadth of the entire effort on which they were bidding. DSC assumed 
that, 
...all of the options would be exercised,...that a significant amount of 
additional hardware would be procured because the solicitation quantities 
were so low by historic standards...and that it would get some FMS add- 
ons during the performance of the contract and that it would realize 10,000 
rockets per year on an international sales basis.[Ref. 17] 
DSC counted on the exercising of the options in order to extend the time 
available to recoup the loss and make the program profitable. DSC also relied on the 
prospect of the additional units available through FMS and direct foreign sales to increase 
the quantities of rockets and move the program to profitability. DSC assumed there 
would be additional FMS sales because the solicitation didn't have a separate line item 
for FMS and the Army had always included FMS units as a separate line item in the past. 
DSC expected to sell 5,000 additional rockets via FMS based on their five-year sales 
record and an additional 10,000 rockets per year worth approximately $20M annually 
through direct overseas sales. DSC knew that FMS competed directly with their direct 
sales, but since the solicitation included no mention of FMS, DSC concluded that there 
would be only an additional FMS requirement of 5,000 per year based on historical 
data. [Ref. 17] 
BEI's discussions with DSC dealt at length with the multiple loss recovery 
scenarios, but ultimately led to the decision to make the $149M bid and recover the loss 
via the multi-faceted recovery programs and steps to manage cash flow. DSC's internal 
analysis revealed that FMS and direct sales had to materialize or DSC would be required 
to finance $8.2M, S19.6M, and $$17.8M in the option periods A, B, and C respectively. 
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DSC would also become responsible for shutdowns caused by unavailable components 
and the integration of the various rocket components using their own processes, neither of 
which they had dealt with in their prior capacity as a LAP contractor. 
Since the Army had deemed Hercules/CMS's and DSC's proposals as 
acceptable from a technical standpoint the price was the deciding factor as to what would 
constitute best value in this situation. DSC won the contract using the $149M bid 
because the Hercules/CMS bid had been S180M. 
The first issue of contention between the Army and DSC arose out of the 
FMS requirement that the Army had not listed as a separate line item in the solicitation. 
The DFARS required that, "known FMS requirements shall be separately identified in 
solicitations"[Ref 17]. Because of differences in how certain costs can be handled 
between a FMS line item and a Government line item, the Government is required to 
identify the level of FMS sales in each contract. The Government Contracting Officer 
admitted that the failure to identify the FMS quantities, "was an omission on our 
part"[Ref. 17]. 
Another issue arose from proposed Special Defense Acquisition Fund 
(SDAF) buys that are similar to the FMS program and also require that the solicitation 
list these items as separate line items. The primary difference is that a FMS requirement 
represents a firm requirement with funds attached to it, whereas a SDAF requirement 
represents an anticipated requirement by a foreign Government that are initially sold to 
the U.S. Government. 
The Government modified the contract to reflect the FMS buys, but left 
the SDAF buys in the base line item of the U.S. Government.   From June 1992 to 
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September 1993 several modifications were used by the Government to more clearly 
define the FMS and SDAF requirements in the contract. 
In summary, the Government ordered 8,908 FMS rockets and 14,212 
SDAF rockets under the basic agreement. It ordered 7,708 SDAF rockets pursuant to 
three modifications under option A. In addition, it ordered 10,881 FMS rockets and 
7,084 FMS rockets under follow-on modifications. [Ref. 17] 
Rather than submitting a claim, DSC chose to submit an executive 
summary on the FMS/SDAF issue in December 1993 seeking 'to achieve 
resolution of its claim by mutual agreement.' The summary confirmed 
that DSC offered a contract price $32M below its estimated cost of 
performance. DSC contended that it had expected to 'offset the loss on 
the basic and option quantities' with (1) new DoD requirements, (2) FMS 
SDAF quantities, and (3) direct international sales.fRef. 17] 
DSC also suffered numerous quality control problems related to the 
contract including non-conforming lockwires, fuse failures, incomplete/inaccurate TDP, 
and Early Motor Blows (EMB). DSC submitted numerous Engineering Change 
Proposals (ECP) in an attempt to correct the technical data package and change the 
processes that it felt were leading to the high failure rates, but these were rejected by the 
Government whose inspectors had determined that DSC was not following the prescribed 
procedures as set forth in the TPD. The Government had started and later stopped a 
criminal investigation on the non-conforming lockwire after DSC had pledged to correct 
the problem. 
Additionally, a subsequent solicitation was issued for a contractor to 
replace fin and nozzle assemblies and an award was made to another contractor despite 
the systems contract DSC had been awarded. 
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The quality problems led to delays in deliveries, which in turn led to a 
suspension of the progress payments that had been identified as critical to DSC's cash 
flow position when the original bid strategy had been considered. 
DSC's claim before the board also requested that the Government pay for 
overhead and profit on the downtime caused by the Government's failure to deliver 
certain Government Furnished Material (GFM) on schedule. 
DSC ultimately completed the base portion and option A of the contract 
but the Government did not consider the exercising options B and C due to the 
performance problems. The solicitation for the follow-on systems contract was a best 
value procurement with technical factors being weighted more than price. DSC did not 
submit an offer, but had agreed to become a subcontractor to Alliant Technologies. A 
total of four firms bid on the solicitation with Martin Marietta Ordnance System being 
awarded the contract. A protest to GAO that claimed the Government had failed to 
inform one of the offerors of deficiencies in its proposal was upheld, forcing the 
Government to re-compete the requirement. The follow-on system contract was also 
awarded to Martin Marietta after the corrections. 
b.        DSC's Claim 
DSC claimed that the initial solicitation and contract failed to alter them to 
the true nature of the requirement relative to the FMS and SDAP requirements that would 
have been accounted for separately and would have had a direct impact on their pricing 
strategy from the beginning. DSC claimed that had it been notified of the true nature of 
the requirement, its pricing strategy would have been completely different with respect to 
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dollar amount per unit and the total number of units it would have projected to be able to 
use in their various loss recovery plans. DSC claimed, 
Having failed to explicitly provide for FMS/SDAF use quantities in the 
contract, IOC is precluded from diverting contract quantities for 
FMS/SDAF use. DSC argues that the Government's failure to comply 
with the applicable regulations constitutes a material breach of the systems 
contract. [Ref. 17] 
DSC also argued that the further failure of the Government to identify the 
SDAF quantities at the same time the modifications for FMS quantities were conducted 
represented a bad faith breach of an oral agreement to separate both FMS and SDAF 
quantities. DSC contends that the Government should be liable for damages, to include 
lost profits of international sales because, 
It was reasonably foreseeable prior to contract award that a breach of the 
contract by the government would cause the loss of current and future 
direct international sales by DSC. DSC asserts that since its bid was 
substantially below that of its competitor's, it was foreseeable that DSC 
would aggressively pursue direct international sales of Hydra-70 rockets. 
DSC also argues that it was foreseeable that its direct international sales 
market would be adversely impacted when the Government made 
available below-cost contract prices for FMS.[Ref. 17] 
DSC argued that the quality problems with the non-conforming lock 
wires, fuse failures, and Early Motor Blows (EMB) were a result of the Government not 
furnishing a accurate and workable TDP and that corrections that would have made the 
manufacturing process as effective, but less expensive were refused by the Government. 
DSC also claimed that the Government's initiation of the criminal investigation of the 
lockwire quality problem was used to delay the negotiation over the delay claim for the 
Government's failure to provide the GFM on schedule. DSC argued that the Government 
used this investigation in bad faith in order to gain a more favorable negotiating position 
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for the claim and that the rework forced on it by the Government was further made to 
delay progress payments while simultaneously increasing DSC's cost to perform. DSC 
further claims that the Government made a concerted, coordinated bad faith effort to 
delay negotiating claims with DSC in a timely manner and suspending progress payments 
for supposed quality issues for which the Government had superior knowledge in an 
attempt exacerbate DSC's cash flow problems and gain advantage. 
In the case of DSC's exclusion from participation in the follow-on systems 
contract award, "DSC seeks the loss of the value of the company attributable to improper 
Government conduct in the administration of the system contract"[Ref. 17]. DSC argued 
that the Government's failure to exercise the options and incorrect contract 
administration with respect to progress payments constituted a breach of the contract. 
c. IOC's response 
The response from IOC to DSC's charges detailed the process by which 
the Government had arrived at the various decisions that led to the claims being advanced 
by DSC in this matter. 
First, with respect to the claim by DSC that IOC failed to follow the 
regulations and separately identify FMS and SDAF requirements from the base 
requirements; the Government contends that the inclusion of various clauses related to 
shipment verification, preparation and submission of forms, and additional progress 
payments for FMS/SDAF should have alerted DSC to the possibility that the contract 
included FMS requirements within the quantities of the initial requirement. 
Second, the Government denied that it was responsible for the quality 
problems encountered by DSC and that if DSC had correctly followed the TDP, it would 
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have produced an acceptable result.   The Government did admit that the Early Motor 
Blows were not the result of any of the processes involving DSC. 
Third, the Government strenuously denied DSC's assertion that it used the 
criminal investigation of the faulty lockwires as a means to apply pressure on DSC in the 
claims negotiations. The Government stated that a former DSC employee had come 
forward and said that DSC was knowingly providing defective lockwires, under this 
situation the only prudent thing to do was to turn the case over to an investigating 
authority. The Government also contended that this would not have given it any 
additional leverage because once it was turned over as a criminal investigation IOC had 
no control over the matter and could not have stopped the proceedings. The Government 
alleged that had DSC corrected the quality problems immediately instead of viewing that 
as a mistake in the TDP that required an ECP they would not have been forced to suspend 
progress payments. The Government also asserted that the only reason they had forced 
DSC to rework the quality problems was to gain a product that met the specification and 
was in no way an attempt to harm DSC through the suspension of progress payments and 
increasing DSC's cost to perform. 
IOC also stated that it suspended progress payments, because of DSC's 
failure to meet the level of progress on the contract that would have warranted the 
progress payments and not in an attempt to harm the cash flow of DSC. IOC argued that 
for DSC's claim on this matter to be upheld, DSC would have to provide "irrefragable 
proof...of some specific intent to injure the contractor such as conspiracy, designedly 
oppressive conduct, animus or malice"[Ref. 17]. 
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Finally, the Government argued that IOC had the right to choose whether 
exercising options B and C, or re-soliciting the systems contract provided a greater 
benefit to the Government and that it was under no obligation to exercise the options. 
The Government concluded that the cost of re-designing the solicitation to reflect a best 
value tradeoff with a heavier weight to the technical factors and pursing the matter 
through the solicitation, evaluation, and award phases represented a greater benefit to the 
Government than exercising the options based on the quality and schedule problems they 
had with DSC. 
d.        ASBCA 's Decision 
ASBCA provided a mixed decision, in some cases agreeing with DSC and 
in others agreeing with the Government's argument. 
First, ASBCA agreed with DSC that the Government failed to follow its 
own regulations with respect to the separate identification of FMS and SDAF 
requirements in the solicitation. The Board also agreed that the Government continued 
this error by failing to identify the SDAF quantities at the same time that IOC was 
modifying the required quantities to reflect the FMS requirements. ASBCA found that 
DSC had provided no "irrefragable poof that the Government had acted in bad faith and 
found that the, "proper remedy for failure to disclose FMS and SDAF requirements is an 
equitable adjustment and no damages for breach of contract."[Ref. 17]. ASBCA also 
found that the Government was not liable for the loss of direct international sales because 
these sales were not foreseeable and not directly related to the systems contract but rather 
an "independent and collateral undertaking"[Ref. 17] and therefore "not recoverable as a 
matter of law" [Ref. 17]. 
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ASBCA also ruled that the DSC failed to prove that the quality problems, 
with the exception of the EMB issue, were a result of incomplete/inaccurate TDP. If 
DSC had followed the TDP exactly, they could have insulated themselves from the 
Governments claim that their failure was the direct cause of the quality problems with the 
Hydra-70. However, since DSC did not follow the prescribed procedures they bore the 
risk of quality problems due to their deviations. The EMB problem was found to be a 
result of the GFM, specifically propellant grains, but since the Government had paid DSC 
separately to screen the inventory and correct the problem no damage to DSC resulted. 
The Board found that there was no proof that the Government misused the 
criminal justice system to improperly delay the negotiation of the delay claims brought 
forth by DSC. Once again, the Board found that DSC had provided no "irrefragable 
proof that the Government had acted in bad faith. 
Finally, ASBCA ruled that IOC had not acted in bad faith nor breached the 
contract by suspending progress payments and later, re-soliciting the systems contract 
instead of exercising options B and C. The Board found that DSC, ".. .failed to show that 
the Government's partial withholding of progress payments was motivated by an intent to 
injure DSC, we hold that DSC has failed to prove bad faith breach of contract..."[Ref. 
17]. The Board also concluded that the Government's decision to not exercise options B 
and C did not constitute improper contract administration; rather the Board found that the 
Government was acting within its rights to make that decision, because, 
...the Government as a matter of law was not obligated to exercise 
Options B and C, we hold the Government did not breach the systems 
contract in awarding the follow-on contract work to Martin Marietta TRef 
17] 
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In summary, the ASBCA found that DSC was entitled to an equitable 
adjustment, including interest, for a total of 8908 FMS rockets and 21,920 SDAF rockets. 
All other portions of the claims were denied. 
e. Conclusions from DSC 
It was determined that mistakes on the part of the Government and the 
contractor led to the demise of DSC as a viable concern. For the Government, failures 
included: failure to properly identify the requirement; failure to correctly judge what 
constituted best value for this acquisition; and a failure to properly determine that the 
offer that the price offered by DSC was fair and reasonable. For DSC, the mistakes 
included: bidding below cost; developing a complex strategy to recoup the losses; and not 
performing in accordance with the contract. 
The biggest error in this case was the Government's failure to separately 
identify the FMS and SDAF requirements on the RFP. This led DSC to assume a larger 
quantity of units over which to recoup their costs and although this does not relieve DSC 
of the responsibility for making such a risky proposal, it was considered doubtful that 
DSC would have underbid on such a grand scale had they known that the quantity was 
limited. 
The Government had failed to correctly determine what constituted best 
value in this acquisition.   IOC determined that if a contractor's technical proposal was 
evaluated as acceptable, lowest price would be the determining factor. Thus in this case, 
the  Government  incorrectly  concluded  that the  lowest price  technical  acceptable 
represented the greatest benefit to the Government along the best value continuum. 
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It appears the Government failed to properly determine a fair and 
reasonable price because the bid was below DSC's cost to perform, thus the more work 
they did the more they lost. This does not alleviate DSC from making a reasonable bid, 
but one of the things that a Contracting Officer is certifying by signing the contract is that 
he/she has determine the price to be fair and reasonable. The fact that DSC's bid was 
S31M (17%) below that of Hercules/CMS should have alerted the Contracting Officer 
that DSC was trying to get the contract through "buy in" or that the bidder did not 
understand the scope of the requirement. 
DSC's bidding strategy was considered irresponsible, because there was 
no way to make a profit unless all of their recovery efforts went smoothly. This 
ultimately led to the downfall of the company as a going concern. DSC risked the entire 
business on a bid where the more work they accomplished the more money they lost. 
Even though the Government failed to separately identify the FMS and SDAF 
requirements, this mistake does not relieved DSC or the BEI board of their fiduciary 
responsibility to the stakeholders. There were alternatives that DSC failed to explore. 
This contract was not a make or break effort, DSC could still have acted as a component 
contractor for the ultimate awardee or teamed with another company for the systems 
contract, either of these options would have reduced the exposure to risk that DSC 
ultimately put itself in. 
The development of the complex strategy to recoup the losses should have 
been unnecessary with a well thought-out bid, but nonetheless relied on too many 
assumptions and the continued cash flow supplied by the progress payments, which DSC 
non-compliance with the contract forced the Government to suspend. 
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It appears that all of these errors were avoidable by the parties involved, 
the case represents an example of many of the things that can go wrong if a best value 
acquisition is not well thought-out or executed. 
C.       CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter analyzed four cases that represented not only the implementation of 
best value in Federal procurement but also the use of judgment by the Contracting Officer 
and the view of how that judgment should be exercised by various adjudicating 
authorities. 
The Meridian protest before the GAO was upheld because the Government failed 
to define the scope of the entire requirement and prevented potential offerors from 
gaining insight into the true scope of the work by denying them access to the laboratories. 
Meridian's protest was also upheld because GSA had failed to consider price in its 
evaluation of offerors to be eliminated from the competitive range, even though the FAR 
requires that price be considered. 
The Ryder dispute before U.S. Court of Federal Claims was denied because the 
Government did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner and did, in fact, follow the 
solicitation. Despite winning the suit, the Government had some problems brought to 
light in this case, such as the failure to properly document the contract file and 
conducting incomplete market research prior to the solicitation. 
The Stratos appeal before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was 
decided in favor of the Government, because the RFP was not ambiguous and the Navy 
had awarded the contract in accordance with the law. 
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In the DSC appeal, the ASBCA found that the Government had failed to follow its 
own regulations by not listing FMS and SDAF quantities as separate line items. This led 
the ASBCA to grant DSC an equitable adjustment based on the correct FMS and SDAF 
quantities. The ASBCA also found that neither the failure to list FMS and SDAF 
separately nor the Government's refusal to exercise the options for future years 
constituted a breach of contract. 
Chapter V will discuss the perception by industry of the Government's use of best 
value and the use of best value by some commercial concerns with respect to their non- 
governmental activities. 
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V.    BEST VALUE FROM A COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will define best value from the perspective of a commercial company 
doing business with the military services, as well as show some of the similarities and 
differences between the Government's implementation of best value and that of the 
commercial sector. Additionally, this chapter will highlight the perceptions that industry 
personnel have expressed regarding the Government's interpretation of how best value is 
defined and implemented. 
The industry sources used for this chapter were interviewed using the questions 
outlined in Chapter III. The specific sources and their companies will remain 
anonymous, but one was a technology company and the other a service company. Each 
company interviewed was a leader in their respective industry. 
B. BEST VALUE DEFINED FROM A COMMERCIAL PERSPECTIVE 
The definition for best value used by the commercial sector is very similar to the 
Government definition derived in Chapter II, i.e., the process by which the Government 
develops a requirement that involves a trade-off between two or more evaluation factors. 
The procurement manual for the technology company defined price philosophy as, 
Prices paid for products and services should be fair and reasonable. Initial 
unit price is only one factor in evaluating the cost of a product. The 
objective is to buy value-which involves quality, reliability, delivery, 
maintenance, and similar considerations. Therefore, awards are placed 
with responsible suppliers at prices calculated to result in maximum value 
and the lowest ultimate overall cost to [the company] and our 
customers. [Ref. 18] 
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The technology company also documented its trade-off judgment in practice by 
using a memorandum that defines both price/cost analysis and a justification as to why 
the selection constitutes best value to the company. The technology company also uses a 
standardized evaluation that specifies evaluation criteria. Broad evaluation criteria used 
on a May 2001 best value procurement included "Technical," "Schedule," and "Cost." 
Some evaluation team members scored based on tenths of points others on full points, but 
since the individual evaluators remained consistent throughout the process it yielded a 
nominal ranking.  The team was then able to discuss, the specifics of each requirement 
and rank-order each offerer. [Ref. 19] 
The "technical" aspect was a threshold requirement. If the proposal did not meet 
all of the core technical requirements, the proposal was eliminated. 
The "schedule" category for this particular procurement was firm, so included not 
only the vendor's promise to meet the schedule, but also the vendor's willingness to back 
up that promise by agreeing to a liquidated damages clause in the contract. The 
"schedule" category also evaluated what reference customers had to say about the 
offeror's ability to meet previous schedules. [Ref.20] 
The service company added that the definition of best value to them is really their 
interpretation of what constitutes best value to the ultimate client. It was considered to be 
a driver for their evaluations, whether another commercial concern or the Government. 
The service company attempted to provide the best value to the customer by identifying 
what the particular client views as the most important factors, and then adjusting their 
proposal, to ensure that their proposal and performance provides the best value.   The 
service company had recently been involved in a Government best value acquisition and 
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found that they were able to discover much about what the Government considered best 
value through the negotiation process. This insight allowed them to adjust certain 
elements in the proposal to win the award. [Ref. 21] The service company indicated that 
cost is always a factor, but its relative importance changes based the level of importance 
placed on it by the end user. Other evaluation factors also varied based on the end users 
perspective; hence flexibility is the key to this company whether dealing with 
Government or a commercial concern. 
C.       BEST VALUE IMPLEMENTATION, A COMMERCIAL PERSPECITVE 
The technology and service companies each had a perspective on the 
implementation of best value in their non-governmental dealings as well as in their 
dealings with the Government. 
1.        Use of Best Value in non-Government contracts 
The technology company expressed the opinion that their use of best value in 
their non-governmental actions had been "a mixed bag".  When the company had taken 
the time and effort to plan, the results had been extremely good, however, when the 
company had not done effective planning or was under a time constraint the results have 
not always been satisfactory.  Much like the Government experiences that were detailed 
in Chapter IV, the failure to plan and research the market prior to solicitation, led to 
difficulties throughout performance.  One area that has greatly increased the technology 
company's ability to make best value tradeoff decision has been the submission of the 
proposal via electronic format. This has allowed for the evaluators to manipulate the data 
during the source selection process and arrive at the best value decision based on variable 
scenarios and multiple requirement factors. [Ref. 20] 
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The service company had a long history of best value dealings as a provider of 
services to other commercial concerns, as well as with the their own purchases from 
suppliers.   The service company thought, as did the technology company, that the best 
value concept starts with the relationship between the companies and not the immediate 
requirement, although that is were many relationships start. The service company stated 
they are viewing a potential supplier in terms of a desired end state and not all of their 
business relationships "start out great right out of the gate," but if they determine that the 
supplier will make an effort, they will keep working with the supplier to both of their 
long term advantage. If the supplier does not "fit," nor is he/she deemed likely to in the 
future, the service company terminates the relationship and moves on to another supplier. 
Thus, the service company maintains business relationships with suppliers who have 
historically provided them best value.[Ref. 21] 
2. Use of Best Value in Government contracts 
When asked what the Government had done well, and what the Government had 
done poorly; the technology company expressed concern that the Government's effort to 
try to pursue development using a fixed price contract would not likely provide the 
Government with a desired outcome. The A-12 experience of the Navy would tend to 
bear this out and the results of a developmental Price Based Acquisition (PBA) will have 
to be reviewed to see if it holds promise for the future. The technology company thought 
that the FAR and other policies that the Government provided a good structure and 
framework from which to operate. The technology company thought that having a 
Contracting Officer and a COTR provided a good mix of expertise. However, the 
COTR's authority needed to be limited and in writing.   The technology company was 
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concerned that best value is not implemented in a standardized fashion across the 
different agencies of the Government. [Ref. 20] 
The service company was fairly new to dealing with the Government, but had 
some critical insight for Government Contracting Officers, as of last year; the 
Government spent more on services than for parts and equipment. The service company 
thought that the Government managed the internal processes well and was aggressive in 
taking on the very complex issues in the acquisition. The service company also thought 
that it had learned a lot during the acquisition that will assist them in providing best value 
in the performance of the contract, as well as with other Government contracts they may 
pursue in the future. The service company expressed a concern that the Government had 
not truly defined the actual costs they were expending for the service they were receiving 
previously nor was the Government all that familiar with the market's capabilities and 
constraints. [Ref. 21] 
The service company also thought a Statement of Objective was preferable to a 
Statement of Work, because as a leader in the industry, having set the performance 
standards for the industry, the standards of the service company where more strict than 
those of the Government. Also, the Government defining the end state without telling the 
contractor how to do each task allowed the service company to use its innovative 
approaches to provide superior service. The service company also expressed a unique 
insight that many who deal with the Government on a regular basis will find most telling 
about the environment in which they operate; and that is for their recent first experience 
in Government procurement they thought that they should have brought more lawyers in 
earlier. 
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C.       AREAS   OF   BEST   VALUE  THAT   MAY   NEED   ATTENTION:   AN 
INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT 
The service company and technology company detailed some areas of best value 
they thought Government needed to address to possibly correct actions and perceptions. 
These companies also highlighted some of the areas that they were working on to 
improve their own use of best value either as on offeror to the Government or as end user 
from their suppliers. 
Contracting Officer Training:  The service company and technology company 
expressed a concern the practice of best value, not consistently practiced, may become 
more disjointed with what they viewed as the impending retirement of so many of the 
people in the Government's acquisition workforce.   The service company said that the 
various trade associations of which it is a member have discussed the issue as both a 
concern and an opportunity. An opportunity because new Contracting Officers would not 
be tied to the old ways of doing business (i.e., certified cost or pricing data) nor would 
they be encumbered with many of the perceived biases that many felt were present in the 
current workforce. The service company expressed the opinion that the Government had 
the opportunity to train the next generation of Contracting Officers in best value and 
inject the lessons already learned into that training program to avoid repeating the 
problems in the future. 
The service company and technology company emphasized their view of the need 
to provide training to the Government's contracting workforce because of a gap in 
expertise and the need for the Government to present one face to industry. Specifically, 
the companies thought the Government needed to place a greater emphasis on the desired 
end state and not how to get there, as this involves a greater reliance on Statement of 
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Objectives. The service company and its trade association agreed that the Performance 
Based Service Acquisition initiative is critical to the industry and the Government, 
because the Government will get better service at less cost and industry would be able to 
incorporate innovation as long as the desired end state was achieved. 
The technology company, which has more experience with Government 
acquisition, said the type of training that Contracting Officers received at NPS and DAU 
that stressed a win-win attitude vice the adversarial relationship of old is a welcome 
change.[Ref. 20] 
COFD Objectivity: Another area that some industry managers think the 
Government needs to work on is the perception that the Contracting Officer's Final 
Decision was not really an objective review by the Government Contracting Officer 
acting in his/her capacity as a neutral adjudicating authority. Rather, the technology 
company expressed a concern that the COFD is perceived as a review by the Contracting 
Officer of a decision in which they had a vested interest and were highly unlikely to 
change. Even the Contracting Officer's who were able to be objective in this process 
needed to be able to communicate the reasoning behind their decisions. 
As detailed in Chapter III, preparation for this thesis involved a review of all 
GAO bid protests from January 01, 2000 to April 30, 2001; of the 136 best value cases 
reviewed by GAO, 106 or 78% were cited for improper evaluation. Of these 106 cases, 
GAO found in favor of the protestor 22 times or 21% of the time. This indicated that not 
only did industry doubt the Government's evaluation objectivity, but in 21% of the cases 
industry  was   correct  in  their  assertion.     This  credibility  gap  was  perhaps  the 
Government's greatest problem for it indicated an erosion of the public trust. 
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Past Performance:  An issue brought forth by the service company was that of 
the Government's use of past performance.   The Government had made a significant 
effort to expand the use of past performance as an evaluation factor at the same time that 
commercial industry was less willing to provide this type of data. The litigious nature of 
today's society may mean fewer companies were willing to provide meaningful 
evaluations for their suppliers because of the fear of a lawsuit. The question of access to 
past performance data would have to be resolved if the Government was going to 
increase the importance of past performance in the evaluations of best value, otherwise 
the only past performance data the Government would be likely to receive would be from 
other Government entities.fRef. 21] 
Commercial Sector Improvements: The technology company was improving 
their method of bidding by trying to conduct more critical self-assessments prior to 
proposal submission. This would not only identify areas they could improve, but where 
they had room to maneuver in negotiations. Another aspect of a self-review this 
company mentioned was that it would also define what it would not do to win a contract. 
That was sacrifice quality or do anything that would damage the ethical standing of the 
company. [Ref. 20] 
D.       DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT USE 
OF BEST VALUE 
It would be difficult for the Government to emulate these commercial practices 
relative to best value, because of the litigation that Government procurement draws. 
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Also, because of the socioeconomic goals that are not designed for efficiency but rather 
to ensure various constituencies are able to participate in the procurement process. 
A private company is able to "fire" a non-performing supplier by not using them 
in the future, and there is no method for an unsuccessful offeror to refute the company's 
decision to not select them. The Government's process has many built in safeguards to 
ensure that all members of the society are treated fairly and reasonably. However, the 
Stratos case demonstrated even when the Government acts in a fair and reasonable 
manner, there may be an aggrieved party, who feels their best chance lies in a lawsuit and 
will take the Government to court in order to win a contract it failed to win at the 
bargaining table. This is a significant difference in that the aggrieved party in 
commercial practice has no recourse, unless the company was clearly discriminatory. 
Whereas, in Government procurement there are numerous avenues to challenge the 
Government's choices, and under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the Government may 
even have to pay for the contractor's legal fees in challenging a Government decision. 
There are rules that the Government must adhere to that force the Government to 
do business with a company with a questionable performance history, or which does not 
have the capability to guarantee a positive outcome. The nature of Congressionally 
mandated socio-economic goals is the very antithesis of the Government's attempt to 
attain best value, in that it interferes with a purely competitive process and puts a weight 
on factors that will provide not immediate benefit to the specific program but will benefit 
society as a whole and future programs through increased participation and strength of 
the industrial base. 
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E.        SIMILARITIES BETWEEN COMMERCIAL AND GOVERNMENT USE 
OF BEST VALUE 
The service company and technology company expressed the views that the 
most important aspect of a successful best value procurement was a complete effort in the 
acquisition planning phase. As highlighted in the cases from Chapter IV, this involves 
defining the trade-off factors and the relative importance of each to the end user; knowing 
the capabilities and limitations of the marketplace; effectively communicating the 
requirement and evaluation factors to the marketplace; and evaluating the proposals 
based on the solicitation. It appears that the goals for best value in Government and 
commercial use are exactly the same in attempting to reach that trade-off point along the 
best value continuum that most closely fulfills the needs of the party involved. 
F.        CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter detailed the results of the interviews of two commercial businesses 
that have practiced best value in their non-governmental activities, as well as having been 
involved in Government best value procurement. These interviews highlighted some of 
the perceived differences and similarities in the way best value has been implemented in 
the two sectors. The interviews also highlighted the perspective of where industry thinks 
the Government needs to apply some effort to improve its use of best value. The chapter 
also detailed the two primary constraints making Government procurement different than 
commercial procurement, socio-economic goals and litigation. Any change the 
Government makes must be made within the context of these constraints. 
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Chapter VI will draw together the lessons learned from Chapters IV and V, 
provide recommendations to mitigate problems, answer the research questions, and 
provide recommended areas for future research. 
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VI.    FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to detail some of the problems that the Government 
experienced implementing best value, including lessons learned from the cases analyzed 
in Chapter IV, such as: acquisition planning issues; solicitation issues, evaluation issues, 
and the industry perception of the Government's use of best value. This chapter will also 
answer the research questions regarding the Government's implementation of best value 
and offer recommendations to improve the use of best value. Finally, this chapter will 
provide recommended areas for future study regarding best value. 
B. ACQUISITION PLANNING ISSUES 
As detailed in Chapter II, acquisition begins with the receipt of the requirement 
from the user. 
Acquisition planning means the process by which the efforts of all 
personnel responsible for the acquisition are coordinated and integrated 
through a comprehensive plan for fulfilling the agency need in a timely 
manner and at a reasonable cost. It includes developing the overall 
strategy for managing the acquisition. The method of contracting and type 
of contract must be determined. A source selection plan and statement of 
work/objective are formulated.[Ref. 22] 
The acquisition planning phase also involves the release of a draft RFP and pre- 
solicitation conferences, if desired and the verification of funding. 
All of the cases presented in Chapter IV revealed areas the Government could 
have improved its acquisition planning phase, even the cases when the ruling favored the 
Government showed areas that could use improvement. 
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Understanding the Requirement:   Meridian demonstrated that a protest could 
be sustained if the Government does not readily understand the nature of the requirement 
or if it is unable to express the requirement. In Meridian, the Contracting Officer failed 
to understand the unique nature of the requirement in the laboratories represented an 
additional risk to potential offerer's and for the contractors to be able to identify the 
complete scope of the requirement the potential offerers needed to be provided access to 
the spaces to be able to assess the requirement for themselves; or the Contracting Officer 
needed to provide detailed data on that portion of the requirement that the potential 
offerers were unable to assess.   The Contracting Officer set the procurement up for a 
sustainable protest and increased the risk to both parties, because the offerer's could have 
been bidding on a service that they did not have a complete picture of and for which the 
awardee would be accountable. 
Understanding the Marketplace:    Ryder demonstrated that not taking into 
account the marketplace from which the Government is trying to attain best value could 
lead to a suit that will cost the Government time and money defending the actions of the 
Contracting Officer.   It is the researcher's contention that the Contracting Officer may 
have been able to insulate the Government from this suit had she thoroughly researched 
the relocation marketplace, seen that several potential offerer's did not have independent 
financial data, and realized that this may present a problem in the evaluation.  The pre- 
solicitation conference would have been a good time to inform all potential offerer's of 
how D&B was going to do the evaluations, particularly since D&B was doing similar 
evaluations for other agencies so the process was not, nor should it have been a secret. 
The Contracting Officer should have foreseen that this was where the difficulties would 
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arise, since the solicitation stated that performance risk was the most important 
evaluation factor. In this case, the Contracting Officer would not have had to change the 
source selection plan or how D&B performed the financial risk assessment. Rather, by 
identifying the problem during the acquisition planning phase she could have diffused it 
at the pre-solicitation conference. Additionally, the input at the pre-solicitation 
conference may have caused the Government to rethink its position and change the 
evaluation plan. However, failing to identify the potential issue in the acquisition 
planning phase meant the Government was not able to address it until the matter was 
before the court, costing the program time and money. In the DSC case, the Government 
failed to understand the marketplace to such an extent that the Contracting Officer 
certified DSC's proposal to provide a fair and reasonable price, despite the fact that it was 
$3 IM below the competitor's proposal and $30M below DSC's cost to perform. 
Dispute Prevention: Stratos demonstrated that even when the Government 
follows all of the regulations and statutes, a disgruntled contractor could still impact the 
program through lawsuits. This case was particularly alarming, because the trial court 
sided with the plaintiff even though the solicitation pointed out that the evaluation would 
take into account several likely outcomes and not only the anticipated usage. The fact 
that the Government prevailed in the appellate court spoke to the thoroughness of the 
plan and the Navy's execution of its plan. The lesson taken away from Stratos was to 
develop a plan that would ensure the Government got best value, and to review the plan 
with legal council to add in language that would insulate the Government from an 
adverse decision. In Chapter IV, such a language was detailed at the conclusion to this 
case, but there are many variations that would accomplish the same goal. 
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Trade-off Decision: DSC represented a poor effort during the acquisition 
planning phase, because the Government set itself up to fail once it decided to select best 
value based on the lowest price technically acceptable side of the best value continuum. 
That trade-off decision was more suitable to a commodity than to this highly complex 
systems contract because it meant that if the proposal were deemed acceptable, price 
would be the sole determining factor in the source selection. The complexity of the 
program and limited oversight by the Government should have indicated some 
performance or technical approach measures should have been considered in the 
evaluation plan. The Contracting Officer for the Government seemed to have learned 
from the DSC case, because the follow-on contract for the HYDRA-70 rocket involved a 
trade-off of technical approach, management expertise and past performance. 
Adherence to Regulations: DSC and Meridian also demonstrated the impact of 
the Government's failure to read and use its own regulations. The failure of IOC to 
separate the FMS and SDAF quantities as required had a direct impact on DSC's bid 
strategy and ultimately played a part in DSC's failures in the performance of the contract 
and as a going concern. In the Meridian case, the failure to consider price, as required by 
the FAR, led to a sustained protest and cost the Government the time and resources to re- 
compete the contract. Additionally, the Government was forced to pay for Meridian's 
legal fees in the protest. 
Each of the four cases detailed in this thesis revolve around a different set of facts 
and were heard before a different adjudicating authority, the one thing the cases share is 
that the acquisition planning phase was the starting point for their ultimate success or 
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failure.  It appears that the time spent in acquisition planning more than pays off in the 
follow-on phases of the contract and acquisition processes. 
C. SOLICITATION ISSUES 
The communication of the requirement, or solicitation, must be detailed enough to 
give the potential offeror a chance to gauge the true scope of the effort they are going to 
submit a proposal on, as well as provide a relative hierarchy of the evaluation factors and 
how the Government views the importance of the tradeoff factors involved on this 
particular requirement. 
Meridian was an example of the solicitation changing the relative weights of 
factors as the proposals were being evaluated as being closer to each other, unfortunately 
for the Government; they left out a mandatory factor-price. Stratos and Ryder each had a 
solicitation that adequately portrayed the requirement and provided the contractors with 
an idea of the relative importance of each of the evaluation factors. 
DSC represented a solicitation that did not accurately portray the scope of the 
requirement nor did it accurately reflect the quantities involved. This incomplete 
solicitation was a contributing factor in the ultimate downfall of DSC. 
D. EVALUATION ISSUES 
The evaluation of the proposals must follow the RFP or a sustainable protest can 
result. The Meridian case highlighted the problem when GAO found that GSA had failed 
to include Meridian in the competitive range, because they had not followed their own 
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solicitation.  The RFP had stated that as the past performance and experience evaluation 
factors became closer, price would take on increased importance. 
The Government failed to evaluate the awardee correctly in the DSC case; 
through its failure to identify the DSC proposal as "buy in" and that this proposal did not 
represent a fair and reasonable price. This failure to correctly evaluate the proposal led to 
problems throughout the performance of the contract, and ultimately to the demise of 
DSC as a business. 
E.        INDUSTRY PERCEPTION OF THE GOVERNMENT ISSUES 
The interviews detailed in Chapter V revealed perceptions held by some 
companies that the Government has some areas to work on regarding best value 
implementation and that there are areas that the Government has proven to be effective. 
Perception of non-objective COFDs: The technology company related the 
perception that the COFD process was viewed as less than objective, because of the 
doubt that a Contracting Officer would be truly objective in evaluating the reasoning used 
for their own decision. This perception appears to be supported by the finding detailed in 
Chapter III. The review of the 136 GAO protests for this thesis revealed 106 were 
protests for an improper evaluation. Of these, 21% were decided in favor of the 
protestor. The Government cannot afford to do its job correctly only 79% of the time and 
maintain the public's confidence. 
Perception of Marketplace Knowledge:   The service company interviewed for 
Chapter V relayed the opinion that the Government was not as familiar with the 
marketplace as had been expected. This required significant adjustment on their proposal 
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as negotiations moved forward and they gained a greater understanding of what the 
Government was looking for in terms of best value. One truth in the commercial and 
Government arenas was that the best customer is an informed customer, in best value this 
means the Contracting Officer must have a firm grasp of what he/she is looking for in 
terms of best value and be aware of what the marketplace is capable of offering. 
Perception of Training: The technology company interviewed in Chapter V 
related the perception that the current emphasis on a "win-win" relationship at NPS and 
DAU is significantly better that the adversarial relationship of the past. The technology 
company also related that the FAR provided a good contracting framework for 
Government Contracting Officers. The service company expressed the opinion that 
Contracting Officers were well trained in identifying factors affecting the procurement. 
F.        RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what extent have recent rulings and decisions by the Federal Courts, Armed 
Services Board of Contract Appeals, and General Accounting Office highlighted 
recurring problems with best value selections and is there a means to eliminate the 
problems? 
The conclusions drawn from this research effort are somewhat similar to those 
drawn by John T. Palmer in his 1997 review of GAO protests involving best value. The 
scope of this thesis is different in that it dealt with cases tried before each of the 
adjudicating authorities involved in Government procurement, but the fact remains that 
acquisition planning failures and the appalling failure to review the applicable rules and 
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laws have not been corrected. Additionally, a standardized framework or template has 
not yet been developed for Contracting Officers to use as a guide. This guide could be 
critical from two standpoints: first, it would give Contracting Officers a well thought out 
framework to begin with; secondly, it could be modified and standardized to reflect the 
most recent court decisions that would have a bearing on the Government's best value 
implementation. It appears no additional regulation is required to improve the 
Government's use of best value. Each of the cases in Chapter IV revealed adequate laws 
were already in place, the problems in these cases arose from the Contracting Officer 
ignoring or misapplying existing laws and regulations. 
2.        Secondary Research Questions 
There are five secondary research questions: 
1.   What  is  the  background and history  of best  value  in   Government 
Procurement? 
As stated in Chapter II, there is no one definition of best value but rather it is the 
concept of moving along a continuum, conducting tradeoffs that will result in the greatest 
overall benefit to the end user. 
In sum, best value is the expected outcome of any acquisition that ensures 
the customer's needs are met in the most effective, economical, and timely 
manner. It is the result of the combination of: the unique circumstances of 
each acquisition; the acquisition strategy; choice of contracting method; 
and the award decision. Best value is the goal of sealed bidding^ 
simplified acquisition, commercial items acquisition, negotiated 
acquisition, and any other specialized acquisition method or combination 
of methods. Through the best value continuum, the Government always 
seeks to obtain the best value in negotiated acquisitions using any one or a 
combination of source selection approaches, and that acquisition should be 
tailored to the requirement. At one end of this continuum is the lowest 
priced technically acceptable strategy and at the other end is a process by 
which elements of a proposed solution can be traded off against each other 
to determine the solution that provides the Government with the overall 
best value. All such tradeoffs must be conducted according to the source 
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selection factors and subfactors identified in the solicitation. [Ref. 22] 
2. What will analysis of Federal Court, Armed Services Board of Contract 
Appeals, and General Accounting Office decisions reveal about the 
Government's implementation of best value? 
The analysis of decisions or recommendations before the various adjudicating 
authorities revealed that the Government must develop a method to ensure that thorough 
acquisition planning takes place for every best value procurement, particularly those that 
involve the use of judgment in the evaluation and selection phases. The Government 
makes a reasoned decision based on the factors that are critical to the end user and must 
be able to document the reasons for the final decision. It is in the acquisition planning 
phase were all of these factors are first considered and start to take form, so it in this 
phase that a successful procurement is born or that is the genesis of the problems 
experienced all the way through performance. 
3. What are the lessons learned regarding best value? 
The primary lesson is that all parties must coordinate their efforts to ensure a 
complete and thorough acquisition plan is conducted. The acquisition planning phase 
becomes even more critical as the procurement gets more complex or where there are 
multiple tradeoff factors involved. 
The secondary lesson applies to all Government procurement, the Contracting 
Officer must understand and apply the rules that bind the Government. Failure to apply 
the rules not only leads to sustainable protests but also to a loss of public trust. 
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4.  How does the commercial sector utilize best value in conducting business? 
The commercial sector was similar to the Government in its use of best value; 
however, there were several key differences. A commercial concern did not need to be as 
concerned with protests or disputes of its actions. As a matter of fact, as long as they did 
not openly discriminate the court system would not intervene in the conduct of normal 
business. 
The commercial sector was also interested in economy, quality, and even to some 
extent, socio-economic goals. However the bottom line was that they are able to be much 
more flexible in their decision making process because of the lack of review by the 
judicial branch. 
Additionally, the companies interviewed also had a standardized framework 
within which to operate. They also ensured complete understanding of what represented 
best value to them or their end user before setting off to fill the requirement. 
5. What mechanism can be put in place for the promulgation, dissemination, 
and incorporation of the lessons into the conduct of the Government's 
procurement professionals? 
The literature review revealed that there was no single source of information 
regarding best value lessons learned.   There were a few thesis', this one included, that 
look at certain aspects of best value, but there was no periodic review of the lessons that 
each of the cases before an adjudicating authority presented.  An acquisition student at 
the Naval Postgraduate School or Defense Acquisition University writing an article or 
series of articles for Contract Management or Army Lawyer magazines in lieu of a thesis 
requirement would be an effective way of promulgating these lessons to Government 
procurement professionals. 
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G.       RECOMMENDATIONS 
This   research   suggests   the   following   recommendations   to   improve   the 
Government's implementation of best value and to avoid litigation: 
• Place emphasis on the acquisition planning phase to ensure that all factors 
relevant to the requirement and marketplace are considered in the formulation of 
the procurement strategy. 
• Forward draft solicitations to industry and hold presolicitation conferences, if 
possible, to ensure a complete understanding of the marketplace by the 
Government and to allow for changes in the solicitation as early in the acquisition 
process as possible. 
• Forward the draft solicitation to legal council for review to ensure all applicable 
regulations have been followed and to insert language that may minimize the 
likelihood of a successful challenge. 
• Future postgraduate students should be given the option of writing a series of 
articles for a periodical in lieu of a thesis. These articles should detail recent 
findings regarding the Government's implementation of best value. 
• Maintain thorough contract files so that the record can "stand on its own" in a 
court proceeding. 
• Contracting Officers should thoroughly debrief a contractor on the judgment and 
reasoning used on a COFD to negate industry's perception that it is not objective. 
H.       AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis illuminated several deficiencies in the Government's implementation 
of best value.   However, since the research was limited in scope and methodology, 
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numerous areas of the Government's implementation of best value remain for future 
research, including: 
• Conduct a review of best value decisions and recommendations from 
GAO, ASBCA, and the Federal courts on a biannual basis. 
The effort could determine if the problems highlighted in this thesis have 
been eliminated or minimized. 
• Develop an evaluation template for the acquisition planning phase. 
This template would assist Contracting Officers in developing the sources 
selection plan with the end user during the acquisition planning phase. 
This template should be in an electronic format to ease its manipulation 
for the specifics of each procurement and in order for changes in the 
Government procurement system to be easily incorporated. 
• Review cases from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
in which the appellate court overturned the decision of the U.S. Court 
of Federal Claims. 
Use the reviewed cases to detail the differences in the application of 
regulations for the same set of facts by these two courts. 
• Monitor the Government's use of best value as the current workforce 
starts to retire to see if the problems highlighted in this effort increase 
or decrease as the more experienced Contracting Officers retire. 
This study would be useful in determining if the educational system for 
Contracting Officers will need to be modified. 
• Write a series of articles for Contract Management magazine and 
Army Lawyer detailing recent best value findings by the various 
adjudicating authorities. 
This action would constitute an indirect continuing education for both 
Contracting Officers and for others involved in the acquisition process. It 
would keep the above persons current in their field. 
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